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PROTECTING TENANTS AT FORECLOSURE
BY FUNDING NEEDED REPAIRS
Steven T. Hasty*
I. INTRODUCTION
In 2008, the investment group Milbank Real Estate Services
effectively abandoned1 ten apartment towers it owned in the
Bronx and defaulted on its $35 million mortgage loan.2 By all
accounts, the buildings were in serious disrepair: the roofs
leaked, rats and roaches infested the apartments, and several
units were fire-damaged.3 Some of the 548 units were
uninhabitable and vacant, but most had tenants living in them.4
After Milbank stopped paying the mortgage, the mortgagee (a

* J.D. Candidate, Brooklyn Law School, 2013; B.A., New York University,
2007. Many thanks to Ian Davie of Legal Services N.Y.C.–Bronx and Shira
Galinsky of South Brooklyn Legal Services for providing helpful background,
to Professor Jessica Attie for her insightful comments, and to the editorial
staff of the Journal of Law and Policy for their input and suggestions.
1
See generally Hearing on Intros. 494, 500, & 501 Before the Comm.
on Hous. & Bldgs. of the N.Y.C. Council, 2011 Leg., 2011 Sess. 164–65
(N.Y. Apr. 14, 2011) [hereinafter Hearings] (testimony of Elizabeth M.
Lynch, MFY Legal Servs.) (“It is a fact that some owners abandon their
property once a foreclosure action is commenced. . . . [But] homeowners
. . . in one- to four-family houses, rarely abandon their homes.”).
2
Tenant-Defendants Memorandum of Law at 1–5, Milbank, No.
380454/09 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Bronx Cnty. Mar. 17, 2009) [hereinafter Milbank
Tenants’ Memorandum of Law].
3
Id. at 3–4. There were 4,300 housing code violations on record at the
time the tenants filed their motion seeking payment from the mortgagee to
cover repairs; 756 were classified as “immediately hazardous.” Id. at 3;
Transcript of Oral Argument at 11–12, Milbank, No. 380454/09 [hereinafter
Milbank Transcript].
4
Milbank Transcript, supra note 3, at 11–12.
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mortgage-backed securities trust)5 began a foreclosure action and
asked the court to appoint a receiver to take control of the
properties.6 Although the securities trust had advanced some
funds for taxes and water bills, the court-appointed receiver had
only a very modest rental income from the properties and could
not afford to make repairs.7 As the foreclosure case dragged on,
some of the tenants began to withhold rent because of poor
housing conditions.8
In April 2010, the tenants moved the foreclosure court for an
order compelling the plaintiff mortgagee to provide enough
funds to enable the receiver to make repairs.9 The tenants
estimated that it would cost $17–25 million to rehabilitate the
buildings,10 but the defendant Milbank was unwilling (or unable)
to pay for even emergency repairs.11 Relying on ten-year-old

5

The parties are described in detail infra at notes 157–62 and in the
accompanying text.
6
Milbank Tenants’ Memorandum of Law, supra note 2, at 4–5.
Receivership is discussed in greater detail below in Part II.
7
Milbank Transcript, supra note 3, at 12, 18.
8
Id. at 12; Amended Affidavit of Cicciu at para. 12, Milbank, No.
380454/09 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Bronx Cnty. Mar. 17, 2009) (“[M]uch of this
arrearage may not be collectible because many tenants are invoking the
defense of breach of the warranty of habitability.”).
9
Milbank Tenants’ Memorandum of Law, supra note 2, at 1. The
tenants were named as “‘John Doe’ Nos. 1–25” in the foreclosure action.
Milbank Transcript, supra note 3, at 16.
10
Milbank Transcript, supra note 3, at 7.
11
See Milbank Tenants’ Memorandum of Law, supra note 2, at 5. Some
of the entities that held title to Milbank’s properties have entered bankruptcy.
Dakota Smith, Downtown’s Roosevelt Lofts Files for Chapter 11 Bankruptcy,
CURBED LA (Apr. 14, 2009), http://la.curbed.com/archives/2009/04/
downtowns_roosevelt_lofts_files_for_chapter_11_bankruptcy.php. According
to its press release, however, “[t]here is no direct legal relationship between
Roosevelt Lofts, LLC and Milbank Real Estate Services, Inc. Milbank is thus
not affected by Roosevelt’s Chapter 11 filing, and continues to operate its
various business operations and real estate ventures without interruption or
oversight by the Bankruptcy Court.” Id. Milbank’s website has remained
static and unchanged since 2008, and its status is unknown. See What’s New,
MILBANK, http://www.milbankre.com/whatsnew.php (last visited May 10,
2012) (listing press releases, the newest of which is dated October 2008).
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appellate court dicta12 and employing a four-factor equitable
test,13 the court ordered the mortgagee to advance $2.5 million
to the receiver during the foreclosure action to cover the cost of
correcting the immediately hazardous conditions in Milbank’s
buildings.14 While this outcome was an important victory for
Milbank’s Bronx tenants, it is unfortunately not the norm.15
During the gap period between an owner’s default and a
judgment of foreclosure, tenants too often face uninhabitable
conditions that go long uncorrected.16
Among the victims of the current mortgage foreclosure
crisis, tenants of buildings in foreclosure are often innocent,
harmed, and overlooked.17 A nonresident investor-owner may
12

See Milbank Transcript, supra note 3, at 10, 20 (discussing Fourth
Fed. Sav. Bank v. 32-22 Owners Corp., 653 N.Y.S.2d 588, 589–90 (App.
Div. 1997)).
13
The court examined (1) the degree of necessity of the expenses, (2)
whether a benefit would accrue to the party who requested that a receiver be
appointed, (3) whether the foreclosing mortgage lender was aware that the
building’s income would be insufficient to pay the receiver’s expenses when
it asked that one be appointed, and (4) whether the funds would be judicially
expended. Milbank Transcript, supra note 3, at 10, 12–13, 18–19.
14
Milbank, No. 380454/09 (granting motion “for reasons stated on the
record”); Milbank Transcript, supra note 3, at 20.
15
See, e.g., Wash. Mut. Bank v. Browne, No. 27151/08 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
Kings Cnty. Oct. 5, 2009) (denying a motion similar to that granted in
Milbank, but granting tenants leave to bring a separate action in Housing
Court); Union Sav. Bank v. 285 Lafayette Assocs., N.Y. L.J., May 20,
1992, at 21 (finding no remedy at law and denying an equitable remedy to
tenants where deficiencies in the building predated the bank’s involvement).
16
Raun J. Rasmussen, Foreclosure Crisis: Both Owners, Many Tenants
to Be Homeless, N.Y. L.J. (Jan. 16, 2009), http://www.newyorklawjournal.
com/PubArticleNY.jsp?id=1202427485794&slreturn=1.
17
Armin Bazikyan, Renters: The Innocent Victims of the Foreclosure
Mortgage Crisis, 39 SW. L. REV. 339, 344 (2009) (“The plight of the renter
has become a silent problem.”); Vicki Been & Allegra Glashausser, Tenants:
Innocent Victims of the Nation’s Foreclosure Crisis, 2 ALB. GOV’T L. REV.
1, 3 (2009) (“[R]enters are often completely unaware that their landlords are
in default until utilities are shut off or an eviction notice appears on their
door.”); Tony S. Guo, Tenants at Foreclosure: Mitigating Harm to Innocent
Victims of the Foreclosure Crisis, 4 DEPAUL J. FOR SOC. JUST. 215 (2011);
Danilo Pelletiere & Keith Wardrip, Renters and the Housing Credit Crisis,
POVERTY & RACE (Poverty & Race Research Action Council, Wash., D.C.),
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endure a lengthy foreclosure proceeding and suffer a serious
financial setback,18 but the resident-tenants of a property in
foreclosure must literally live with the consequences19—from
leaks and recurrent mold to broken appliances and lack of heat
and hot water.20 Although the primary threat to tenants at
foreclosure is eviction by usual means,21 they also face the threat
of constructive eviction because of uninhabitable conditions.22
The owner of a multiple dwelling in foreclosure typically has
inadequate funds to make repairs required by the applicable
housing code and the implied warranty of habitability (the basic
guarantee that a rented residence will be livable), leaving tenants
especially vulnerable.23
Further, a judicial foreclosure action may take years to
resolve,24 and the presence of a court-appointed receiver may
July/Aug. 2008, at 3, available at http://www.prrac.org/full_text.php?text_
id=1189&item_id=11271&newsletter_id=100.
18
Rasmussen, supra note 16.
19
Memorandum of Law of Proposed Amicus Curiae, The Council of the
City of New York, in Support of Tenants’ Motion at 5, Nat’l Bank of
N.Y.C. v. 296 5th Ave. Grp., No. 29057/09 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Kings Cnty.
Nov. 16, 2009) [hereinafter City Council Amicus Brief] (“[T]housands of
tenants in multifamily rental properties risk being exposed to substandard
living conditions due to decisions they did not make.”).
20
Rasmussen, supra note 16.
21
See Eloisa Rodriguez-Dod, Stop Shutting the Door on Renters:
Protecting Tenants from Foreclosure Evictions, 20 CORNELL J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 243, 245, 247 (2010). Tenants may also risk losing their security
deposits. Been & Glashausser, supra note 17, at 3.
22
Raun J. Rasmussen, When a Landlord Disappears; Bank Held Liable
for Maintaining Building During Foreclosure, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 17, 1996, at
29. “A constructive eviction occurs when there is an abandonment by the
tenant because the continued beneficial use of the premises is impossible.”
Manhattan Mansions v. Moe’s Pizza, 561 N.Y.S.2d 331, 332 (Civ. Ct.
1990).
23
Rasmussen, supra note 16. New York, like many other states, has
codified the warranty of habitability. See N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 235-b
(McKinney 2006).
24
Amy C. Cutts & William A. Merrill, Interventions in Mortgage
Default, in BORROWING TO LIVE 204–05 (Nicholas P. Retsinas & Eric S.
Belsky eds., 2008) (“The foreclosure process varies widely across states . . .
[and] lasts an average of 355 days between the due date of the last payment
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introduce additional complexity—such as requiring court
approval of, or the lender’s consent to, larger expenses.25
Usually, a temporary receiver has only the income from current
rents to pay for upkeep.26 When a building needs a new roof or
boiler, for example, such a major expenditure may be
impossible without financial assistance from the owner or
lender.27
Tenants should not have to bear these costs by enduring
falling plaster, peeling paint, recurrent mold, and inadequate
heat and hot water, nor should tenants be constructively evicted
by housing conditions so unlivable that they are the equivalent of
a sheriff or city marshal executing a warrant of eviction. Where
an owner has resources and is subject to a court’s jurisdiction,
the tenants can often hold the owner directly accountable.28 But
where an owner has filed for bankruptcy or has abandoned a
failing investment property, the foreclosing lender should step in
to pay for needed repairs.29 Further, fairness may require the
lender to pay where the owner’s default was inevitable because
the lender recklessly made an oversized loan, incentivizing the
owner to pressure low-income tenants to leave by withholding
made and the loss of the home at a foreclosure sale, but ranged from 248 to
598 days.”). More recent estimates reflect the full impact of the crisis. See
Susan Saulny, When Living in Limbo Avoids Living on the Street, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 3, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/04/us/when-livingin-limbo-avoids-living-on-the-street.html (“In New York, the time to
complete a foreclosure has almost quadrupled, from 263 days in 2007 to
1,019 days in 2011.”).
25
See, e.g., Nat’l Bank of N.Y.C. v. 296 5th Ave. Grp., No. 29057/09
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Kings Cnty. Sept. 9, 2010) (limiting receiver to repairs
costing $2,000 or less absent prior court approval or lender consent).
26
Andrew L. Herz et al., What to Expect When a Receiver Takes over a
Troubled Property (With Mortgage Foreclosure Receiver’s Checklist), PRAC.
REAL EST. LAW., Sept. 2011, at 33, 35; see also infra Part II.
27
See Rasmussen, supra note 22.
28
Rasmussen, supra note 16.
29
Id. (“[M]any landlords in foreclosure simply won’t show up; a default
judgment does little to get repairs completed.”); see also Tess Vigeland, They
Walked Away, and They’re Glad They Did, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 9, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/09/your-money/life-goes-on-some-findafter-leaving-an-underwater-mortgage.html (describing process of mortgagors
avoiding legal proceedings through careful timing).
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repairs.30 Some states and local governments have passed laws
requiring foreclosing mortgage lenders to pay for postjudgment
upkeep.31 But for innocent renters who must cope with poor
housing conditions during the foreclosure action—from the
mortgagor’s default until judgment—these laws leave substantial
gaps, often spanning years.32
This Note argues that courts should extend application of
Milbank’s equitable rule to hold foreclosing lenders accountable
for interim repairs, out of fairness to innocent tenants who face
constructive eviction during a foreclosure. Part II provides
background on judicial mortgage foreclosure actions and the role
of temporary receivers. Part III surveys the remedies currently
available for tenants and demonstrates why these measures
inadequately protect tenants by leaving a gap period—between
default and judgment—during which no one is held responsible
for substandard housing conditions. Part IV examines the
Milbank case and the grounds for holding lenders financially
responsible for interim repairs. Part V argues that courts should
apply Milbank’s equitable test to determine whether the
mortgage lender in a foreclosure action should bear the cost of
remediating serious housing code and warranty of habitability
violations during the pendency of the action, where other
financial sources are inadequate. Extending the rule
complements existing law requiring postjudgment upkeep, helps
prevent neighborhood blight, and places the burden of repairing
abandoned apartment buildings on the party best able to bear the
cost.
Recognizing that the application of a powerful yet
manipulable equitable rule may be somewhat uneven, Part VI
recommends that state legislatures establish a duty on the part of
foreclosure plaintiffs to pay for needed repairs to multiple
30

See infra Part III.
See, e.g., N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 1307 (McKinney 2009);
Mark Oltmanns, City Fights to Keep Banks Accountable for Blight in
Foreclosed Homes, RICHMOND CONFIDENTIAL (Feb. 10, 2011),
http://richmondconfidential.org/2011/02/10/city-fights-to-keep-banksaccountable-for-blight-in-foreclosed-homes/.
32
See City Council Amicus Brief, supra note 19, at 8; Rasmussen, supra
note 22.
31
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dwellings. Additionally, states might require foreclosure
plaintiffs to post a compliance bond to cover the anticipated cost
of needed repairs. As of this writing, the New York City
Council is considering adopting similar legislation, yet if the
effort is successful, the local laws face possible preemption
challenges. Meanwhile, at the state level, reform faces
significant practical and political hurdles. Finally, while this
Note focuses on New York law, the argument for the extension
of an equitable rule may have wider implications for many U.S.
jurisdictions with judicial foreclosure processes.
II. TENANTS AT FORECLOSURE AND THE ROLE OF THE RECEIVER
Thirty-six states permit both judicial and nonjudicial
foreclosures; the other fourteen, New York among them, require
a judicial process.33 In New York, the entire process can take
years.34 A foreclosure action usually begins when the borrower
(the mortgagor) fails to make payments under the associated
promissory note.35 Then, the lender (the mortgagee) may file an
action to foreclose on the mortgaged property.36 Many actions
settle, but if the action proceeds to judgment, the mortgagee will
33

NAT’L LAW CTR. ON HOMELESSNESS & POVERTY, NAT’L LOW INCOME
HOUS. COAL., WITHOUT JUST CAUSE: A 50-STATE REVIEW OF THE (LACK OF)
RIGHTS OF TENANTS IN FORECLOSURE 7, 7 n. 4 (2009) [hereinafter WITHOUT
JUST CAUSE], available at http://www.nlchp.org/content/pubs/Without_Just_
Cause1.pdf. Nonjudicial foreclosures vary in their precise mechanics, but
typically do not involve a judge unless the borrower seeks judicial
intervention. Id. at 7.
34
ALVIN L. ARNOLD, REAL ESTATE INVESTOR’S DESKBOOK § 11:32 (3d
ed. 2011) (describing reasons some mortgagees seek a deed in lieu of
foreclosure, one of them being to avoid the delay and expense of a judicial
foreclosure proceeding); Herz et al., supra note 26, at 34.
35
NEIGHBORHOOD ECON. DEV. ADVOCACY PROJECT, PATHS OF A
FORECLOSURE IN NEW YORK STATE (2010), http://www.ahphome.org/library/
path_of_a_forecosure.pdf [hereinafter PATHS OF A FORECLOSURE]. A
mortgage follows the promissory note and remains enforceable by the note
holder as it changes hands. N.Y. U.C.C. LAW § 9-203(g) (McKinney 2002);
Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co. v. Pietranico, 928 N.Y.S.2d 818, 829 (Sup.
Ct. 2011).
36
PATHS OF A FORECLOSURE, supra note 35.
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typically request that the court appoint a referee to sell the
property to the highest bidder, in order to satisfy the mortgage
debt.37
In New York, a judgment of foreclosure severs a tenancy,
provided the tenant was made a party to the foreclosure action,38
(though Part III describes some important exceptions to this).
Tenants are often named as John or Jane Does in the foreclosure
action and are subject to the orders of the foreclosure court.39
During the foreclosure action, however, the tenancy continues,
and the same lease terms and rent remain in effect.40 For a bank
holding the mortgage note on a multiple dwelling, often an
investment property, it is problematic for the property to
languish and rents go uncollected.41 A receiver solves this
problem, acting as a temporary caretaker, taking in the
building’s income and maintaining its condition, both for the
lender as well as the current occupants.42 In New York,
foreclosure plaintiffs often seek receivers for apartment buildings
with six units or more.43
37

Id.
6820 Ridge Realty LLC v. Goldman, 701 N.Y.S.2d 69 (App. Div.
1999) (holding that where tenant was not joined in foreclosure action, new
owner’s remedy was eviction proceeding, not writ of assistance). Other states
do not require that tenants be made parties to the foreclosure action.
WITHOUT JUST CAUSE, supra note 33, at 8.
39
Milbank Transcript, supra note 3, at 16. But see 103rd Funding
Assocs. v. Salinas Realty Corp., 714 N.Y.S.2d 47, 49 (App. Div. 2000)
(failing to intervene below, tenants lacked standing to appeal trial court
order).
40
Ifantides v. Mikeway Enter., Inc., N.Y. L.J., Nov. 27, 1991, at 25
(“[A]bsent fraud or collusive action in anticipation of foreclosure or
receivership, pending a judgment of foreclosure and sale the receiver may not
collect a higher rent from a tenant than is stipulated in a lease.”). Renewal
leases entered into during the foreclosure action may change the amount of
rent or other terms of the tenancy. Herz et al., supra note 26, at 37–38.
41
See Herz et al., supra note 26, at 33–34.
42
Id.
43
See Holmes v. Gravenhorst, 188 N.E. 285, 286 (N.Y. 1933) (“Where
. . . the mortgagor is not in possession during the foreclosure of [the]
mortgage . . . and the premises are occupied by tenants . . . a receiver may
be appointed in a proper case to take possession of the premises, collect the
rents, and apply them to the payment of the carrying charges on the property
38
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A temporary receiver is an officer of the court, and one may
be appointed at the request of the parties to the action, typically
the mortgagee-plaintiff.44 Even though the mortgage agreement
may provide for a receiver, courts “exercise extreme caution in
appointing receivers . . . because such appointment [generally]
results in the taking and withholding of possession of property
from a party without an adjudication on the merits.”45
Appointing a receiver effectively terminates the mortgagor’s
right to collect rents but not its ownership of the property.46
Technically, the owner holds title until the final judgment of
foreclosure, even though a court’s order appointing the receiver
may require the owner to surrender possession.47
State law makes clear that the receiver has only those powers
conferred by the appointing order.48 The receiver’s presence “is
intended to protect the lender from the risk that the borrower
will
mismanage
the
property
or
misappropriate
revenue . . . [and] to assure that the property does not
deteriorate under the control of a distracted and penniless
borrower.”49 Appointing a receiver also allows the lender to
insulate itself from liability that could result were it deemed a
“mortgagee-in-possession.”50 Acquiring the status of a
and the reduction of the mortgage debt.”). Anecdotally, receivership is not
often used for smaller multifamily buildings. Rasmussen, supra note 16.
44
Herz et al., supra note 26, at 34 (“Any well-drafted mortgage usually
states that the holder of the mortgage can have a receiver appointed if the
lender starts a foreclosure action.”).
45
Jacobowitz v. Jacobowitz, 798 N.Y.S.2d 710 (Sup. Ct. 2004)
(unpublished table decision) (quoting Hahn v. Garay, 387 N.Y.S.2d 430, 431
(App. Div. 1976)) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
46
In re Koula Enters, Ltd., 197 B.R. 753, 758 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1996)
(applying New York law).
47
See, e.g., Nat’l Bank of N.Y.C. v. 296 5th Ave. Grp., No. 29057/09
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Kings Cnty. Sept. 9, 2010) (“All persons now or hereafter in
possession of said premises or any part thereof and not holding such
possession under valid and existing leases or tenancies do forthwith surrender
such possession to said Receiver, subject to emergency laws, if any.”).
48
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 6401(b) (McKinney 2010); Daro Indus., Inc. v. RAS
Enters., 380 N.E.2d 160, 161 (N.Y. 1978).
49
Herz et al., supra note 26, at 33–34.
50
N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 9-101 (McKinney 2010) (“A receiver of

590

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

“mortgagee-in-possession” will not equate the mortgagee’s rights
and duties with those of an owner.51 But a receiver’s rights,
duties, and powers are even more limited in scope, allowing the
mortgagee to limit its potential liability and to insulate itself
from most direct claims.52
For its necessary expenses, the receiver has priority over
other creditors when the property is sold.53 A receiver’s
necessary expenses, including the cost of complying with legal
duties like the warranty of habitability, “constitute a first charge
or lien against the receivership property and funds . . . [with]
priority over preexisting liens of mortgagees,”54 including the
plaintiff-mortgagee’s lien.55 Thus, even when the sale price
yields less than the amount of the loan, the receiver’s necessary
interim expenses will usually be covered.56 Additionally, upon
judgment, the receiver may apply for reimbursement from the
mortgagee for necessary expenses incurred during the action.57
Thus, the receiver can be made whole even without a sale: if the
lender takes title to the property and keeps it on its books as real
estate owned, the receiver may seek reimbursement of necessary
expenditures directly from the foreclosing mortgagee.58
In New York, a receiver is considered an owner for
rents and profits appointed in an action to foreclose a mortgage upon real
property shall be liable, in his official capacity, for injury to person or
property sustained by reason of conditions on the premises, in a case where
an owner would have been liable.”); Mortimer v. E. Side Sav. Bank, 295
N.Y.S. 695, 699 (App. Div. 1937) (finding mortgagee-in-possession liable as
owner); Herz et al., supra note 26, at 34.
51
Trajam Realty Corp. v. Hirschfeld, 452 N.Y.S.2d 37, 39–40 (App.
Div. 1982).
52
Herz et al., supra note 26, at 38.
53
91 N.Y. JUR. 2D Receivers § 44 (2004) (citing Farmers’ Loan & Trust
Co. v. Bankers’ & Merchants’ Tel. Co., 42 N.E. 707 (N.Y. 1896)).
54
Id.
55
91 N.Y. JUR. 2D Receivers § 84 (2004) (citing Vill. of Stillwater v.
Hudson Valley Ry. Co., 174 N.E. 306 (N.Y. 1931); Cent. Trust Co. of
N.Y. v. Pittsburgh, S. & N.R., Co., 119 N.E. 565 (N.Y. 1918)).
56
See Corcoran v. Joseph M. Corcoran, Inc., 521 N.Y.S.2d 757, 760
(App. Div. 1987) (allowing receiver to recover attorney’s fees).
57
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 8004(b) (McKinney 1981).
58
Id.; Land v. Esrig, 43 N.Y.S.2d 623, 626 (Sup. Ct. 1943).
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purposes of complying with the New York Multiple Dwelling
Law and New York City Housing Maintenance Code.59 Once
appointed, the “receiver is charged with the responsibility to
‘preserve and protect the property for the benefit of all persons
interested in the estate.’”60 State law further directs courts in
New York City to include in their appointing orders that the
receiver will give priority to remedying housing code
violations.61
Ordinarily, the receivership’s expenditures are limited to the
money it takes in from the property.62 In many cases, this will
not be sufficient to pay for anything beyond basic taxes, fees,
and charges (e.g., for water and heating oil).63 When there is a
59

N.Y. MULT. DWELL. LAW § 4(44) (McKinney 2001); N.Y.C.
CHARTER & ADMIN. CODE ANN. §§ 27-2004(45), 27-2005 (N.Y. Legal
Publishing Corp. 1993).
60
Bank of Tokyo Trust Co. v. Urban Food Malls Ltd., 650 N.Y.S.2d
654, 665 (App. Div. 1996) (quoting Jamaica Sav. Bank v. Florizal Realty
Corp., 407 N.Y.S.2d 1016, 1018 (Sup. Ct. 1978)). “The legal responsibility
of a receiver to maintain the receivership property in good repair is settled
law.” 79 N.Y. JUR. 2D Mortgages § 862 (2003) (citing Griffo v. Swartz, 306
N.Y.S.2d 64, 75 (Cnty. Ct. 1969)). “A receiver in a foreclosure action . . .
stands in the shoes of the owner, and has a legal duty to maintain the
property in good repair and is liable for damages for the failure to meet that
duty.” Mercedes v. Menella, 827 N.Y.S.2d 73, 74 (App. Div. 2006) (citing
Fourth Fed. Sav. Bank v. 32–22 Owners Corp., 653 N.Y.S.2d 588, 589
(App. Div. 1997)).
61
N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 1325(3) (McKinney 2009) (“In a city
with a population of one million or more persons an order appointing a
receiver to receive the rents and profits of a multiple dwelling shall provide
that the receiver . . . expend rents and income and profits as described in
subdivision two of this section, except that a priority shall be given to the
correction of immediately hazardous and hazardous violations of housing
maintenance laws within the time set by orders of any municipal department,
or, if not practicable, seek a postponement of the time for compliance.”); see
also Memorandum of the City of New York, in 1983 N.Y. LEGIS. ANN. 303
(“[T]enants . . . many times face dangerous health and safety situations. This
bill would afford court appointed receivers with proper guidance during the
mortgage foreclosure period.”).
62
Herz et al., supra note 26, at 35. The receiver may also enter into
lease agreements for the premises and take out necessary loans, subject to
court approval. Id. at 37–38.
63
See, e.g., City Council Amicus Brief, supra note 19, at 14.
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deficit, the receiver will look to the foreclosing mortgagee, who
is probably the receiver’s only source of additional funds.64 State
law permits the mortgagee to advance funds to the receiver of a
multiple dwelling65 in order to correct violations, but it does not
explicitly require it to do so.66 Mortgagees typically attempt to
recoup these advances as part of the ultimate recovery from the
mortgagor.67 Where the need goes beyond the building’s income
and any advances, this statutory scheme falls short of meeting
the receiver’s obligations to innocent tenants.68
III. CURRENT LAW INADEQUATELY PROTECTS THE INNOCENT
VICTIMS OF FORECLOSURE
The United States faces an unprecedented crisis in the rate of
defaults on mortgages. By the end of the current crisis, between
8 and 13 million homes will have been foreclosed on, according
to some predictions.69 Millions more borrowers are
“underwater,” owing more on their mortgages than their real
estate is worth, and are in danger of foreclosure if they fall
64

Herz et al., supra note 26, at 35.
N.Y. MULT. DWELL. LAW § 4(7) (McKinney 2001) (“[A] multiple
dwelling . . . [is] . . . a dwelling which is either rented, leased, let or hired
out, to be occupied, or is occupied as the residence or home of three or more
families living independently of each other.”).
66
MULT. DWELL. § 302-b(1) (“[W]here a receiver has been appointed in
foreclosure proceedings instituted by a mortgagee with respect to any multiple
dwelling, such mortgagee may advance to such receiver funds necessary for
the operation of such multiple dwelling and for the making of repairs therein
necessary to remove conditions constituting violations of this chapter.”
(emphasis added)).
67
Herz et al., supra note 26, at 35 (“Most mortgage documents do allow
the lender to spend money to protect its collateral, and then recover those
expenses from the borrower as part of the borrower’s secured obligation.”).
68
But see Litho Fund Equities, Inc. v. Alley Spring Apartments Corp.,
462 N.Y.S.2d 907, 909 (App. Div. 1983) (holding that the court may
consider “whether there [a]re special circumstances that make it equitable to
impose additional receivership expenses on [the mortgagee] even though the
expenses exceed the rent collected”).
69
Vicki Been et al., Decoding the Foreclosure Crisis: Causes,
Responses, and Consequences, 30 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 388, 388
(2011).
65
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behind on payments.70 The end does not appear to be in sight.71
As recently as August 2011, the number of new mortgage
foreclosure filings jumped significantly, and as of March 2012,
observers are noting a troubling new trend in foreclosure
activity.72 Nor is the crisis limited to places like Florida,
California, Texas, and Arizona, where the bursting housing
bubble left neighborhoods dotted with empty “McMansions” and
dying lawns.73 New York City, despite having a relatively stable
housing supply, suffered a massive price bubble74 and has seen a
rapid increase in foreclosure filings.75 And it is not just
homeowners who are suffering: experts estimate that more than
20% of the properties in foreclosure nationwide are rentals,76
70

Editorial, On the Road to Relief, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 25, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/25/opinion/on-the-road-to-mortgagerelief.html (“Currently, some 14.5 million borrowers are underwater, on
average, by $50,000.”).
71
Ann Carrns, Foreclosure Crisis Isn’t Even Halfway Over, Analysis
Finds, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 30, 2011), http://bucks.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/11
/30/foreclosure-crisis-isnt-even-halfway-over-analysis-finds/.
72
The Foreclosure Report–August 2011, FORECLOSURE RADAR,
http://www.foreclosureradar.com/foreclosure-report/foreclosure-reportaugust-2011 (last visited Feb. 18, 2012) (attributing jump to filings by Bank
of America); Matthew Yglesias, Foreclosure Fraud Settlement Filing Leads to
Spike in Foreclosure Activity, SLATE (Mar. 15, 2012), http://www.slate.com/
blogs/moneybox/2012/03/15/foreclosure_fraud_settlement_filing_leads_to_spi
ke_in_foreclosure_activity.html.
73
See June Fletcher, The McMansion Glut, WALL ST. J. (June 16,
2006), http://online.wsj.com/article_email/SB115042445578782114-lMyQjAx
MDE2N TEwNjQxMjY0Wj.html (“McMansions . . . [are] . . . oversized
homes—characterized by sprawling layouts on small lots, and built in cookiecutter style by big developers.”).
74
See Edward L. Glaeser et al., Housing Supply and Housing Bubbles
28 (Harvard Inst. of Econ. Research Discussion, Paper No. 2158, 2008)
(“[M]arkets with highly elastic supply sides are much less likely to have
‘bubbles.’”).
75
Hearings, supra note 1, at 5 (statement of Erik Martin Dilan,
Chairperson, Comm. on Hous. & Bldgs. of N.Y.C. Council) (“According to
a report published last month by the New York State Co[mp]troller’s Office,
between the years 2006 and 2009, the number of foreclosure filings within
the City of New York rose approximately 32%, to 22,866.”).
76
Aleatra P. Williams, Real Estate Market Meltdown, Foreclosures and
Tenants’ Rights, 43 IND. L. REV. 1185, 1185 n.1 (2010) (citing JOINT CTR.
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and in New York City, more than half the families affected by
foreclosures are renters.77
Tenants of buildings in foreclosure face special challenges.
In addition to evictions without cause, foreclosures often lead to
a substantial increase in housing code or warranty of habitability
violations.78 Absentee owners may simply abscond with tenants’
rent payments without investing in any building upkeep.79 The
problem is especially acute in low-income neighborhoods and
communities of color.80
Predatory lending has exacerbated the problem of troubled
mortgages81 and has caused many properties to go underwater.82
HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., AMERICA’S RENTAL HOUSING: THE
KEY TO A BALANCED NATIONAL POLICY 14 (2008)).
77
DANILO PELLETIERE, NAT’L LOW INCOME HOUS. COAL., RENTERS IN
FORECLOSURE: DEFINING THE PROBLEM, IDENTIFYING THE SOLUTIONS 2
(2009), available at http://www.nlihc.org/doc/renters-in-foreclosure.pdf (“In
New York City, the Furman Center conservatively estimated that if an owner
lived on-site in every multi-unit building and none of the single-family
residences in foreclosures were rentals, 50% of the nearly 30,000 families
affected by foreclosure were renters.”) (citing Press Release, Furman Ctr. for
Real Estate & Urban Policy, New Analysis of NYC Foreclosure Data
Reveals 15,000 Renter Households Living in Buildings that Entered
Foreclosure in 2007 (Apr. 14, 2008), available at http://furmancenter.org/
files/FurmanRelease_RentersinFore closure_7_14_ 2008.pdf).
78
VICKI BEEN ET AL., FURMAN CTR. FOR REAL ESTATE & URBAN
POLICY, STATE OF NEW YORK CITY’S HOUSING & NEIGHBORHOODS 2010, at
5–6 [hereinafter STATE OF N.Y.C. HOUSING REPORT] (“The analysis finds
that buildings receive an average of 21 percent more violations during the
specific quarter in which a lis pendens is filed, and 15 percent more
violations during the two quarters prior to the lis pendens issuance and the
two quarters after, compared to what the building received in other
periods.”).
79
See Bob Hennelly, What Happens When No One Wants to Own a
Place, WNYC (Aug. 15, 2011), http://www.wnyc.org/articles/wnyc-news/
2011/aug/15/ what-happens-when-no-one-wants-own-place/.
80
Justin P. Steil, Innovative Responses to Foreclosures: Paths to
Neighborhood Stability and Housing Opportunity, 1 COLUM. J. RACE & L.
63, 76–86 (2011); Catherine Dunn, Foreclosure Crisis Fades to Black and
Brown, CITY LIMITS MAG. (Aug. 15, 2011), http://www.citylimits.org/news/
articles/4363/foreclosure-crisis-fades-to-black-and-brown.
81
See Christopher J. Mayer & R. Glenn Hubbard, House Prices, Interest
Rates, and the Mortgage Market Meltdown 7–8 (2008) (unpublished
FOR
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During the latest real estate boom, investors bought up
properties in New York and other cities with low rent rolls,
hoping to evict tenants paying below-market rents,83 remove
apartments from rent regulation,84 and re-rent units at market
rate.85 Many such plans were based on unrealistic expectations.86
manuscript), http://www.nber.org/public_html/confer/2008/cff08/mayer.pdf
(attributing worst of crisis to overleveraging real estate values).
82
Yuliya S. Demyanyk & Otto Van Hemert, Understanding the
Subprime Mortgage Crisis, 24 REV. FIN. STUD. 1848, 1872 (2011)
(“[L]enders were to some extent aware of high [loan-to-value] ratios being
increasingly associated with risky borrowers.”); Angela Maddaloni & JoséLuis Peydró, Bank Risk-taking, Securitization, Supervision, and Low Interest
Rates, 24 REV. FIN. STUD. 2121, 2124 (2011).
83
“[S]enior citizens, long term tenants, and the disabled. . . . [A]re often
singled out by landlords for eviction because they often have been in the
apartment for many years and thus pay lower rents.” Jambes v. Veale, 504
N.Y.S.2d 982, 986 (Civ. Ct. 1986) (quoting Budhu v. Grasso, 479 N.Y.S.2d
303, 306 (Civ. Ct. 1984) (quoting Memorandum of Assemblyman Richard N.
Gottfried. in 1984 N.Y. LEGIS. ANN. 109 (supporting revisions to N.Y.
COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 2524.4 (2000) (Rent Stabilization
Code)))).
84
State law allows an owner to remove a vacant apartment from rent
stabilization by spending forty times the difference between the legal
regulated monthly rent and $2,500 (but the owner must spend sixty times the
difference in rent in a building with more than 35 apartments). Fact Sheet
#12 – Rent Increases for Individual Apartment Improvements (IAI), N.Y.
STATE HOMES & CMTY. RENEWAL, http://nysdhcr.gov/Rent/FactSheets/
orafac12.htm (last updated July 31, 2011); see also Fact Sheet #36 – HighRent Vacancy Deregulation and High-Rent High-Income Deregulation, N.Y.
STATE HOMES & CMTY. RENEWAL, http://nysdhcr.gov/Rent/FactSheets/
orafac36.htm (last updated July 2011).
85
ASS’N FOR NEIGHBORHOOD & HOUS. DEV., PREDATORY EQUITY:
EVOLUTION OF A CRISIS 4 (Nov. 2009), available at http://www.anhd.org/
resources/Predatory_Equity-Evolution_of_a_Crisis_Report.pdf (finding that
predatory equity loans “could place up to 100,000 apartments at risk”); see
also Milbank Tenants’ Memorandum of Law, supra note 2, at 2 (“The
predatory equity model leads inevitably to widespread defaults that undermine
the financial system while causing displacement of low income families.”).
86
See, e.g., Terry Pristin, Tenants Fret Over Big Debt at a Top Address,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 21, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/21/
realestate/commercial/tenants-anxious-over-next-move-at-a-manhattanlandmark.html (“[T]he Belnord loan was based on unrealistic expectations
about how quickly rent-regulated apartments would become vacant.”).
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Regulated apartments have not become vacant as often, nor have
rents increased as much, as owners had hoped.87 Much of the
financing made available to real estate investors who bought
rental buildings now appears inappropriately outsized because
lenders did not account for realistic rental income, costs of
repairs, heating oil or gas, and other necessary expenses on top
of the debt service payments, while at the same time, real estate
prices and equity have collapsed.88 Consequently, some owners
have purposefully withheld repairs to coerce tenants to vacate
their apartments, in order to improve their bottom line.89
Repairs are of less concern, however, if tenants also face
eviction proceedings because of the foreclosure, but they are
crucial for long-term tenants with an interest in staying put.90 In
New York City, many tenants are entitled to renewal leases
under the Rent Stabilization Code,91 or continued tenancy under
the Rent Control Law,92 the benefits of which they may no
longer have if forced to move.93 Outside New York City, similar
87

City Council Amicus Brief, supra note 19, at 15.
Id.
89
Id. at 10 (describing rationale behind Tenant Harassment Act); E-mail
from Shira Galinsky, Staff Att’y, S. Brooklyn Legal Servs., to author (Oct.
20, 2011, 02:15 PM EST) (on file with author) (“[W]ithholding repairs is a
very popular method of enhancing turnover.” (quoting Posting of Jonathan
Levy, Deputy Dir., Hous. Unit, Legal Servs. N.Y.C.–Bronx, Jlevy@bx.lsnyc.org, to N.Y.C. Hous. Discussion, HousingNYC@wnylc.net (Sept. 15,
2011, 2:29 P.M.))).
90
But see Minjak Co. v. Randolph, 528 N.Y.S.2d 554 (App. Div. 1988)
(holding that abandonment due to uninhabitable conditions may absolve the
tenant from paying rent).
91
See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 2524.1 (2000) (provision
of the Rent Stabilization Code prohibiting eviction).
92
See id. § 2104.1 (provision of the Rent Control Law prohibiting
eviction).
93
Raun J. Rasmussen, Defending Rent-Controlled Tenants Against
Eviction, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 8, 1992, at 3 (“Unfortunately for tenants in New
York City, many banks fail to investigate the rent regulatory status of the
tenants who occupy the building upon which they have foreclosed, and bring
meritless motions for writs of assistance. Tenants are confused by the legal
papers, confused by the forum, and unable to get legal assistance if they are
low income. They therefore fail to appear, fail to assert valid defenses, and
end up evicted and homeless.”); Rasmussen, supra note 16.
88
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laws apply in a handful of jurisdictions.94 In other states, such as
Massachusetts,95 and in thirteen jurisdictions in California,96
tenants at foreclosure are protected from eviction without good
cause—at least until the property is transferred to a new owner.
In addition, current federal law allows all tenants of one-to-four
family buildings to continue their valid leases during and after a
foreclosure sale, up to the end of the lease term.97 Federal law also
allows recipients of federal Section 8 Housing Choice vouchers,
which subsidize private rentals for eligible individuals, to remain in
their apartments after a judgment of foreclosure and sale.98
It would thwart these laws’ purpose if uninhabitable
conditions were to lead to constructive evictions. Affordable
housing in expensive urban markets like New York City is also
threatened if housing conditions deteriorate to the point where
constructive evictions lead to tenants leaving, allowing the
owners to remove apartments from rent regulation.99 Legislators
at every level of government have enacted protections for paying
tenants who, by no fault of their own, risk becoming homeless
because of a foreclosure. As the following sections will
demonstrate, however, those responses have not adequately
94

Daniel Finkelstein & Lucas A. Ferrara, [F] NEW YORK PRACTICE,
LANDLORD AND TENANT PRACTICE IN NEW YORK § 11:1, n.1 (West 2011).
95
Compare MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 186A, § 2 (2012) (“[A] foreclosing
owner shall not evict a tenant except for just cause or unless a binding
purchase and sale agreement has been executed for a bona fide third party to
purchase the housing accommodation from a foreclosing owner.”), with An
Act Requiring Tenant Protections in Foreclosed Properties, S.B. 1609, 186th
Gen. Ct. (Mass. 2009) (proposing further, postsale tenant protections).
96
Nicole Gon Ochi, The California Tenant Stability Act: A Solution for
Renters Affected by the Foreclosure Crisis, 17 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. &
POL’Y 51, 65 n.124 (2010) (listing California jurisdictions with “just cause”type eviction protection measures for tenants at foreclosure).
97
Protecting Tenants at Foreclosure Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 11122, § 701–04, 123 Stat. 1632, 1660–62 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5220, 42
U.S.C. § 1437 (Supp. 2010)), amended by Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1484, 124 Stat. 1376,
2204 (2010)) (clarifying and extending the Protecting Tenants at Foreclosure
Act of 2009 until December 31, 2014).
98
§ 701–04, 123 Stat. at 1660–62.
99
See infra Part V.B.1.
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addressed the crucial gap period between an owner’s default and
the moment title passes to a new owner.
A. Federal Statutory Response
Recognizing the plight of tenants at foreclosure, Congress
passed the Protecting Tenants at Foreclosure Act of 2009
(PTFA).100 The PTFA applies to one-to-four family dwellings
and provides that, in the case of a foreclosure, any new owner
takes title subject to the tenants’ bona fide leasehold interests;
but if the lease expires, or if the new owner intends to occupy
the premises as a primary residence, then the tenant is entitled to
ninety days notice before any eviction.101 The PTFA further
protects tenants in any size building who receive federal Section
8 Housing Choice Voucher subsidies.102 Although the PTFA
adds important protections against immediate eviction, it does
not address the plight of tenants facing uninhabitable conditions
during and after the foreclosure process, which may take years
to unfold.103 Moreover, the PTFA sunsets in 2014.104 Because the
PTFA only applies to buildings “designed principally for the
occupancy of from one to four families,” it would have only
applied to Milbank’s tenants who received Section 8 vouchers,
and not to the buildings generally.105 The PTFA is an important
100

§ 701–04, 123 Stat. at 1660–62.
Id. The PTFA applies to foreclosures of “federally-related mortgage
loans,” a wide category that includes any loan for a one-to-four family
dwelling made by a bank whose deposits are insured by FDIC. 12
U.S.C. § 2602 (2006).
102
§ 701–04, 123 Stat. at 1660–62.
103
Elan Stavros Nichols, Unanswered Questions Under the PTFA:
Exploring the Extent of Tenant Protections in Foreclosed Properties, 20 J.
AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 153, 165–66 n.90 (2011)
(citing Creola Johnson, Renters Evicted en Masse: Collateral Damage Arising
from the Subprime Foreclosure Crisis, 62 FLA. L. REV. 975, 977, 990 (2010)).
104
§ 701–04, 123 Stat. 1632.
105
12 U.S.C. § 2602 (2006). Section 8 voucher recipients are already
protected by federal regulations that require owners to meet certain housing
quality standards. Housing Quality Standards, 24 C.F.R. § 982.401 (2011);
DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., NO. 7420.10G, HOUSING CHOICE VOUCHER
PROGRAM GUIDEBOOK 10-1 (2001), available at http://www.hud.gov/offices/
101
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step, but it is a temporary measure that does not address
habitable conditions for tenants at foreclosure.
B. State Statutory Responses
Similarly, New York law provides additional protections but
still leaves substantial gaps. In 2009, Governor David Paterson
signed into law Senate Bill S66007,106 which revised New York
Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law (RPAPL) section
1307 to require plaintiffs in foreclosure actions (usually
mortgage lenders) who obtain judgments of foreclosure to
maintain the foreclosed properties during the period between
judgment and sale.107
Unfortunately, however, the statute is silent with respect to
the crucial period from the mortgagor’s default to judgment,
when the building may be in the hands of a court-appointed
receiver.108 This period could span several years. The bill as
written purports to “relieve[] the plaintiff [i.e., the mortgagee]
of the responsibility to maintain the property for the period that
a receiver of such property is serving,” but it also purports to
not “diminish any obligations of the mortgagor or receiver to
maintain the property prior to the closing of the title and [to] not
diminish or reduce the rights of the parties under existing law
against the mortgagor of the property for failure to maintain

adm/hudclips/guidebooks/7420.10G/7420g10GUID.pdf.
106
Senator Klein Joins Governor Paterson in Signing into Law Landmark
Foreclosure Legislation, N.Y. ST. SENATE, http://www.nysenate.gov/video/
2009/dec/15/senator-klein-joins-governor-paterson-signing-law-landmarkforeclosure-legislation (last visited Feb. 20, 2012).
107
N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 1307 (McKinney 2009). But see
Daniel Beekman, Bank-owned Bronx Buildings ‘Ticking Time Bombs’; Wells
Fargo and Deutsche Ignore Building Codes, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Aug. 2,
2011), http://articles.nydailynews.com/2011-08-02/local/29859994_1_domingocedano-deutsche-bank-buildings-department (suggesting banks are ignoring
section 1307’s mandate); Aarti Shahani, With Banks As Landlords, Some
Tenants Neglected, NPR (Feb. 23, 2012), http://www.npr.org/2012/02/23/
147160871/with-banks-as-landlords-some-tenants-neglected
(documenting
similar cases in California and Maryland).
108
See REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 1307.
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such property.”109 Uncertainty about the ability of mortgagees to
enter and control the premises during the foreclosure
proceeding, when the mortgagor technically retains ownership,
would perhaps explain why the legislature declined to extend
these obligations to mortgagees during the foreclosure action.110
In a multiple dwelling foreclosure, however, courts often
appoint a receiver, who steps into the shoes of the owner and
assumes the duty to maintain the building, but who often lacks
the funds to do so.111
Not only does it neglect to address this significant gap in
time during which tenants are particularly vulnerable, but
RPAPL section 1307 also fails to achieve its stated goals. If its
purpose is to protect tenants during foreclosure, but the
mortgagor cannot afford to make payments on its mortgage, it is
likely that the mortgagor cannot afford to pay for upkeep needed
to protect those tenants. Many tenants may be constructively
evicted long before a judgment is entered. Moreover, if a
building deteriorates during the foreclosure action, it may cost
the mortgagee more to fulfill its duties under RPAPL section
1307—maintaining the property from judgment to sale—than it
would have if the mortgagee had begun making repairs as soon
as a receiver stepped in.112 Finally, there is evidence that
foreclosing banks are simply ignoring section 1307’s mandate.113
109

S.B. 7V § 6, 232 Leg., Spec. Sess. (N.Y. 2009); see also infra Part

V.
110

See Hearings, supra note 1, 80–81 (testimony of Michael P. Smith,
President & C.E.O., N.Y. Bankers Ass’n).
111
See supra Part II.
112
See D.C. DEP’T OF CONSUMER & REGULATORY AFFAIRS, No.
680931, STUDY GUIDE FOR PROPERTY MANAGERS EXAMINATION 16 (2011),
available at http://www.asisvcs.com/publications/pdf/680931.pdf (“Often, by
‘investing’ in preventive maintenance, the owner will save money by avoiding
costly emergency repairs.”). For example, reroofing an apartment building to
halt leaks may be expensive, but it may be much less expensive to take this
preventive step than to wait until the building also requires extensive mold
remediation resulting from water leaks. See Bill Boles, Missteps with Mold,
HOME ENERGY, July/Aug. 2002, at 38, 40, available at http://www.bestof
buildingscience.com/pdf/Missteps%20with%20Mold%20HEM_19-4_p3841.pdf.
113
Beekman, supra note 107.
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Another, older New York law contemplates a possible
community-based approach to abandonment. Article 7A of the
RPAPL “provides for the appointment by housing court judges
of private administrators to manage residential buildings that
have been ‘effectively abandoned’ by their owners, and in which
conditions are ‘dangerous to life, health, or safety’ of tenants.”114
A third or more of a building’s tenants can petition for an
administrator.115 The process can be contentious, lengthy, and
time-consuming,116 however, and it can be difficult for tenants to
agree on strategy and to find competent people willing to serve
as administrators.117 As a result, Article 7A–administered
buildings remain relatively rare.118
Outside New York, similar statutes offer some protection for
tenants at foreclosure.119 Massachusetts law is particularly tenant
friendly: new owners who obtain title in a foreclosure sale may
not evict existing tenants without just cause.120 Other states have
yet to enact “just cause” measures, but are making limited
progress on other fronts.121 In Texas, for example, although its
state laws are even less protective of tenants at foreclosure than
the PTFA, the legislature recently passed two measures aimed at
helping renters of properties in foreclosure:122 (1) Texas Justice
Courts may now issue orders restoring utility services to renters,
114

HON. G. OLIVER KOPPELL & MOLLY WASOW PARK, N.Y.C. INDEP.
BUDGET OFFICE, REVIEW OF THE DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING PRESERVATION
AND DEVELOPMENT’S ARTICLE 7A PROGRAM 1 (2003) (quoting N.Y. REAL
PROP. ACTS. LAW art. 7A (McKinney 2009)), available at http://www.ibo.
nyc.ny.us/ iboreports/7amemo.pdf.
115
Id.
116
For example, the proceeding may first be adjourned several times to
allow the owner to attempt to remedy the conditions. See In re Dep’t of
Hous. & Pres. Dev., N.Y. L.J., Oct. 1, 1992, at 21.
117
Rasmussen, supra note 22.
118
See KOPPELL & PARK, supra note 114 (finding 123 buildings under
7A administration as of 2003).
119
WITHOUT JUST CAUSE, supra note 33, at 8.
120
See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
121
WITHOUT JUST CAUSE, supra note 33, at 8.
122
Elizabeth M. Bruman, Legislative Changes Impacting the Residential
Landlord Tenant Relationship in Texas, HOUS. LAW., Jan./Feb. 2010, at 38,
39–40.
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a frequent issue for tenants at foreclosure, and (2) courts may
also order repairs costing up to $10,000.123 It is unclear,
however, whether repair orders would be enforceable against
anyone but the owner, such as the mortgagee. Like New York,
other states have sidestepped the messy issue of who is
responsible for repairs during the foreclosure proceeding and
have done little to protect innocent tenants from constructive
eviction.
C. Local Administrative Responses
Direct government intervention may also protect tenants
from hazardous code violations.124 Where an absent or negligent
owner fails to correct serious violations of the Housing
Maintenance Code, the New York City Department of Housing
Preservation and Development (HPD) may step in to make
repairs and restore essential services.125 The agency then bills the
owner or places a tax lien on the property to recoup the amounts
expended.126 Additionally, New York City’s Safe Housing Act127
created an Alternative Enforcement Program to target the city’s
worst 200 buildings with more focused efforts.128 But only the
most serious cases receive agency attention, government action
may be long in coming, and the remedial measures may be
merely a stopgap.129 Moreover, the expense of HPD’s emergency
123

Id. at 40.
See N.Y.C. CHARTER & ADMIN. CODE ANN. §§ 27-2125, 27-2128
(N.Y. Legal Publishing Corp. 1993). Section 27-2005 of the Administrative
Code mandates compliance with New York City’s Housing Maintenance
Code. New York State’s warranty of habitability is codified at N.Y. REAL
PROP. LAW § 235-b (McKinney 2006).
125
Rasmussen, supra note 16 (“Tenants can get help with some
emergencies, such as cascading water leaks and empty boilers, from
[HPD].”).
126
N.Y.C. CHARTER & ADMIN. CODE ANN. §§ 27-2125, 27-2128 (N.Y.
Legal Publishing Corp. 1993); City Council Amicus Brief, supra note 19, at
7.
127
N.Y.C., N.Y., LOCAL LAW No. 29, Int. No. 561-A (2007); City
Council Amicus Brief, supra note 19, at 8.
128
City Council Amicus Brief, supra note 19, at 8–9.
129
Rasmussen, supra note 16 (“[F]or conditions that the city considers
124
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repairs are an unnecessary burden on the city budget where a
lender has filed a foreclosure action to recover its security for a
mortgage loan and sought a receiver to protect the value of that
security.130 These remedies fill a necessary role, but they should
be a last resort.
D. Private Ordering
When faced with uninhabitable conditions, tenants may also
employ self-help.131 For example, tenants may band together or
solicit charity in order to pay heating bills when an owner fails
to supply heat in the dead of winter.132 Two principal problems
with this approach are the inability of poor tenants to pay for
self-help, and the uncertain recoupment of expenses, especially
where the owner has “walked away” from the property.133
Increasingly, community-based organizations are getting
involved, sometimes to purchase distressed properties in order to
turn them into permanent affordable housing.134 Although
less dangerous, e.g., broken windows, leaky ceilings, mold or rat infestation,
tenants may have no recourse but self help.”).
130
See City Council Amicus Brief, supra note 19, at 7–8 (noting
burden). Many of the same cities that face foreclosure crises also face budget
shortfalls and have precious few staff devoted to maintaining the quality of
private property for renters. See Roger Lowenstein, Broke Town U.S.A.,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 3, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/06/
magazine/06Muni-t.html (describing cuts to local government services).
131
Fourth Fed. Sav. Bank v. 32-22 Owners Corp., 653 N.Y.S.2d 588,
589 (App. Div. 1997) (“The tenants . . . claimed to have expended more
than $50,000 of their own money in repairs to the building . . . .”);
Missionary Sisters of the Sacred Heart v. Meer, 517 N.Y.S.2d 504, 508
(App. Div. 1987) (“[A] tenant may take it upon himself to incur an expense
for a repair or service which the landlord is obligated to provide, and he may
sue to recover the cost . . . .”).
132
See Rasmussen, supra note 22.
133
See id.
134
JOSIAH MADAR ET AL., FURMAN CTR. FOR REAL ESTATE & URBAN
POLICY, TRANSFORMING FORECLOSED PROPERTIES INTO COMMUNITY ASSETS
3 (2009), available at http://furmancenter.org/files/FurmanCenterWhite
Paper_TransformingForeclosedPropertiesIntoCommunityAssets.pdf; Nicholas
Hartigan, No One Leaves: Community Mobilization as a Response to the
Foreclosure Crisis in Massachusetts, 45 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 181, 202–
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advocates are cautiously optimistic that this mechanism will gain
traction and spread, it is still relatively rare.135 Moreover, the
process may simply take too long to make this an appropriate
remedy for urgently needed repairs.136
Finally, tenants in these situations have a cause of action
against the current owners, which they may bring before the
foreclosure court or in a separate action.137 In New York City,
state law allows a special part of the Housing Court to hear
petitions (called “HP actions”) by tenants against owners who
fail to comply with the Housing Maintenance Code.138 Initiating
an HP action in Housing Court is fairly simple: claimants fill
out a preprinted form and pay a small fee.139 In contrast, in a
foreclosure action involving a receiver, tenants cannot sue the
03 (2010); James J. Kelly, Jr., Refreshing the Heart of the City: Vacant
Building Receivership as a Tool for Neighborhood Revitalization and
Community Empowerment, 13 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV.
L. 210, 210 (2004).
135
See Hartigan, supra note 134, at 200–03. Examples of such
organizations in New York City include the Fifth Avenue Committee and the
Pratt Area Community Council. See Affordable Housing, FIFTH AVE.
COMM., http://www.fifthave.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=page.viewPage&page
ID=610&nodeID=54 (last visited Nov. 19, 2011) (“FAC has built or
renovated 600 units of affordable housing for low and moderate- income
residents since 1978 and we currently have nearly 400 units in
development.”); Housing Development, PRATT AREA CMTY. COUNCIL,
http://pacc.publishpath.com/housing-develop ment (last visited Nov. 19,
2011) (“Since 1988, PACC has developed more than 600 units of housing in
more than 65 buildings . . . .”). By contrast, the New York City Housing
Authority administers 178,882 units of public housing. Fact Sheet, N.Y.C.
HOUS. AUTH., http://www.nyc.gov/html/nycha/html/about/fact sheet.shtml
(last updated Mar. 18, 2011).
136
MADAR ET AL., supra note 134, at 6, 12, 21, 22, 34 (noting delay, as
well as organizational and financial hurdles to closing deals). But see id. at
32 (documenting one case where length of time property remained abandoned
was shorter than through the regular foreclosure process).
137
Rasmussen, supra note 22.
138
Hon. Robert F. Dolan, 3 RASCH’S NEW YORK LANDLORD & TENANT
INCLUDING SUMMARY PROCEEDINGS § 40:4 (4th ed. 2011).
139
ASS’N OF THE BAR OF N.Y.C. HOUSING COURT PUB. SERV. PROJECTS
COMM. & CIVIL COURT OF N.Y.C., FERN A. FISHER, ADMIN. JUDGE, A
TENANT’S GUIDE TO THE NEW YORK CITY HOUSING COURT 19 (2006),
http://www.nycbar.org/pdf/report/tenantsguide.pdf.
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receiver without leave of the appointing court.140 Thus, they are
forced to make a motion in State Supreme Court, which might
entail hiring an attorney familiar with both landlord-tenant and
foreclosure law.141 This is a far more complicated task than
beginning an HP action.142 Additionally, the New York City Tenant
Harassment Law143 makes it illegal for landlords to intentionally
harass tenants, which includes disrupting essential services or
neglecting to make repairs.144 But the owner who can no longer
keep up with his or her mortgage payments may not even show up
when sued, and the tenant plaintiff may be left with a useless
judgment, unable to collect.145 In either case, a lawsuit (or the
threat of one) would probably result in a negotiated settlement, but
would likely only protect the tenants if that threat were credible. In
sum, currently available remedies are inadequate for tenants of
buildings in foreclosure who urgently need repairs.
IV. HOUSING ADVOCATES IN NEW YORK CITY EXTEND AN
EQUITABLE REMEDY
Tenant advocates have attempted to use existing statutory and
case law to protect the vulnerable, but sometimes advocates must
140

Barton v. Barbour, 104 U.S. 126, 127 (1881); Kilarjian v. Kilarjian,
299 N.Y.S.2d 750, 751–52 (App. Div. 1969). But see Madison III Assocs.
v. Brock, 685 N.Y.S.2d 239, 240 (App. Div. 1999) (“[T]his Court has
discouraged resort to Supreme Court where complete relief can be accorded
by the Housing Part of the Civil Court.”).
141
See Milbank Transcript, supra note 3, at 4 (“Mr. Del Valle [counsel
for the receiver]: . . . he [a contractor] had brought a motion down there [in
Civil Court] asking for permission [to sue the receiver], but the Court said
you have to come up to the Supreme Court. He didn’t understand. It’s a pro
se litigant, your Honor.”).
142
See, e.g., Wash. Mut. Bank v. Browne, No. 27151/08 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. Kings Cnty. Oct. 5, 2009) (denying a motion similar to that granted in
Milbank, but authorizing the tenants to bring an HP action in Housing
Court).
143
N.Y.C., N.Y., LOCAL LAW NO. 7 INT. NO. 627-A (2008).
144
City Council Amicus Brief, supra note 19, at 10.
145
Rasmussen, supra note 16 (“[M]any landlords in foreclosure simply
won’t show up; a default judgment does little to get repairs completed.”);
Rasmussen, supra note 22.
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push the envelope. In 1996, before the enactment of RPAPL
section 1307, a New York trial court ordered a foreclosing bank
to make repairs to a long-neglected property.146 The bank had
already won a judgment, but it had allowed twenty-nine months to
elapse before requesting a sale.147 Meanwhile, the tenants suffered
without heat or hot water and with other dangerous conditions.148
Significantly, the bank had become the legal owner of the
premises, and therefore compelling it to maintain the premises
was novel but relatively straightforward.149 State law now codifies
such a duty, but it would take twelve years after this action for
the legislature to pass this provision into law.150 Even after
RPAPL section 1307’s enactment, tenants still often face poor
housing conditions during and after foreclosure proceedings.151
This is illustrative of a broader problem: statutory and court-made
law have not brought relief for tenants in certain circumstances.
Faced with few viable options, tenant advocates have turned to
making equitable arguments before foreclosure courts.152 This Part
summarizes the facts in Milbank and the equitable rule that the
court applied.
A. The Facts of Milbank
As foreclosure filings have increased during the financial
crisis and overwhelmed court dockets, for some tenants, the gap
period that RPAPL section 1307 leaves open has become
146

Dep’t of Hous. Pres. & Dev. v. Greenpoint Sav. Bank, 646 N.Y.S.2d
601, 604 (Civ. Ct. 1995); see also Rasmussen, supra note 22. N.Y. REAL
PROP. ACTS. LAW § 1307 (McKinney 2009).
147
Greenpoint Sav. Bank, 646 N.Y.S.2d at 691.
148
Id. at 604.
149
Id.
150
REAL PROP. ACTS. § 1307.
151
See Beekman, supra note 107 (suggesting banks are ignoring section
1307’s mandate); Shahani, supra note 107.
152
See, e.g., Nat’l Bank of N.Y.C. v. 296 5th Ave. Grp., No. 29057/09
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Kings Cnty. Dec. 20, 2011) (granting motion similar to that
in Milbank); N.Y. Cmty. Bank v. 1255 Longfellow LLC, No. 306660/10
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Bronx Cnty. Aug. 12, 2010) (filing with similar motion
pending).
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interminable. In a recent case in New York Supreme Court for
Bronx County, a mortgagee sought to foreclose on ten large
apartment buildings.153 With some 4,300 housing code violations,
the buildings were in terrible shape.154 A quarter of the 548 units
were vacant and uninhabitable, but the rest had tenants, who
suffered through conditions ranging from intermittent heat and
hot water to leaks and mold.155 On the tenants’ motion, the
Supreme Court ordered the mortgagee to advance $2.5 million
to the receiver, enough to correct the immediately hazardous
conditions.156
In November 2006, Los Angeles–based Milbank Real Estate
Services began investing in its Bronx portfolio, financing the
purchase of ten apartment buildings with a $35 million loan
from Deutsche Bank.157 The bank repackaged the mortgage into
a $3 billion mortgage-backed securities trust named “COMM2006-C8,” (“the Comm trust”) which, in turn, was sold to
investors.158 When Milbank’s investment soured, it stopped
paying its mortgage, and the Comm trust began a foreclosure
action,159 creating a special-purpose limited-liability company to
serve as plaintiff.160 It named as defendants the Milbank group’s
five LLCs, in which Milbank had placed title to the Bronx
properties, two personal guarantors, several NYC agencies that
might have had liens on the properties, and twenty-five John
153

Milbank, No. 380454/09 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Bronx Cnty. Sept. 29,

2010).
154

Milbank Transcript, supra note 3, at 11.
Id. at 12.
156
Milbank, No. 380454/09 (granting motion “for reasons stated on the
record”); Milbank Transcript, supra note 3, at 20.
157
Milbank Tenants’ Memorandum of Law, supra note 2, at 1; Affidavit
of Whitney Wheeler in Opposition to Order to Show Cause at paras. 7–14,
Milbank, No. 380454/09 [hereinafter Wheeler Affidavit].
158
Milbank Tenants’ Memorandum of Law, supra note 2, at 1; Wheeler
Affidavit, supra note 157, at paras. 7–14. For background on mortgage
securitization, see GEORGE LEFCOE, REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS, FINANCE
AND DEVELOPMENT 177–80 (6th ed. 2009).
159
Milbank Tenants’ Memorandum of Law, supra note 2, at 1.
160
Supplemental Affidavit of Whitney Wheeler in Opposition to Order to
Show Cause at para. 3, Milbank, No. 380454/09 [hereinafter Wheeler
Supplemental Affidavit].
155
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Does.161 The plaintiff sought a receiver, and the court appointed
Consolato Cicciu (“the receiver”) in March 2009.162
The receiver complained that he did not have anywhere near
the funds he needed to comply with the appointment order, which
required him to maintain the premises and to correct “hazardous
and immediately hazardous violations”163 of the Housing
Maintenance Code.164 Though the Comm trust opposed the
tenants’ motion, it admitted that “the status quo is untenable.”165
The trust pointed out that it had already advanced over $1 million
to the receiver for repairs, as the law permitted but did not
require it to do.166 The receiver, however, reported that he used
the money to pay current water and heating oil bills, and that
none of it was spent to correct violations.167 The tenants stressed
that the equities favored an order requiring the lender to advance
additional funds to correct hazardous conditions.168
161

Wheeler Affidavit, supra note 157, at paras. 7–14. The plaintiff had
moved to dismiss against the John Doe defendants, and claimed the tenants
lacked standing to bring their motion, but the court had reserved decision on
the motion to dismiss against the John Doe defendants and declined to
dismiss the tenants’ motion for lack of standing. Milbank Transcript, supra
note 3, at 14, 16.
162
Amended Affidavit of Cicciu, supra note 8, at para. 2.
163
This tracks the language of N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 1325
(McKinney 2009). “Hazardous” and “Immediately Hazardous,” further
correspond to “B” and “C” violations, definitions of which are promulgated
by local authorities. HPD Online Glossary, HPD, http://www.nyc.gov/html/
hpd/ html/pr/hpd-online-glossary.shtml (last visited Nov. 20, 2011) (“The
law establishes three classes of violations which are: ‘A’, non-hazardous; ‘B’,
hazardous; or ‘C’, immediately hazardous.”).
164
Amended Affidavit of Cicciu, supra note 8, at paras. 8–16.
165
Milbank Transcript, supra note 3, at 19.
166
Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Non-Party Tenants’
Application for an Order Directing the Court-Appointed Receiver to Cure All
Code Violations and to Compel Plaintiff to Advance the Funds Necessary to
Do So at 2, Milbank, No. 380454/09 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Bronx Cnty. Mar. 17,
2009) [hereinafter Brief of Comm 2006-C8] (describing advancing funds to the
receiver pursuant to N.Y. MULT. DWELL. LAW § 302-b(1) (McKinney 2001)).
167
Amended Affidavit of Cicciu, supra note 8, at paras. 14–15.
168
Tenant-Defendants’ Brief in Reply to Plaintiff’s Opposition and in
Further Support of Tenant-Defendants’ Order to Show Cause at 8–12,
Milbank, No. 380454/09 [hereinafter Reply Brief of Tenant-Defendants].
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In granting the tenants’ motion, the Milbank court relied on its
equitable power, as well as on state law (RPAPL section 1325)
providing that a receiver’s priority is to correct housing code
violations.169 That a foreclosure court should fashion an equitable
remedy is not all that surprising—traditionally, foreclosures were
actions at equity,170 and today, foreclosure courts still have the
power to create a suitable remedy that does substantial justice
among the parties before them, even without a statute or precedent
to guide them.171 As far as ordering a mortgagee to advance funds
to a receiver, one court expressed its equitable function as follows:
“[t]he plaintiff may not be heard to object when called upon to
meet an ordinary obligation necessarily and obviously incidental to
the relief which he himself sought, obtained and from which he
reaped benefits.”172 Following these guideposts, the Milbank court
held that the statutory postjudgment recoupment procedure was not
an exclusive remedy,173 and that an equitable remedy could exist
alongside the statutory one, even before a judgment.
169

Milbank Transcript, supra note 3, at 19 (“[It] seems to me the equity’s
here . . . .”); N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 1325(3)(b) (McKinney 2009);
see also Memorandum of the City of New York, supra note 61.
170
Graf v. Hope Bldg. Corp., 171 N.E. 884, 886 (N.Y. 1930) (Cardozo,
J., dissenting) (“There is no undeviating principle that equity shall enforce
the covenants of a mortgage, unmoved by an appeal ad misericordiam [to
pity], however urgent or affecting. The development of the jurisdiction of the
chancery is lined with historic monuments that point another course.”).
171
See In re Foreclosure of Tax Liens, 872 N.Y.S.2d 805, 805 (App.
Div. 2009) (reversing a holding that “would result in a disproportionately
harsh result”); Domansky v. Berkovitch, 687 N.Y.S.2d 41, 42 (App. Div.
1999) (affirming money judgment as “necessary to the accomplishment of the
directives set forth in the order of appointment, and also serving to protect
and preserve the [property] during the pendency of the action”); Lirosi v.
Elkins, 453 N.Y.S.2d 718, 723 (App. Div. 1982) (“[A] court of equity is not
precluded from fashioning a suitable remedy, although precedent is
wanting.”); Caspert v. Anderson Apartments, 94 N.Y.S.2d 521, 525 (Sup.
Ct. 1949) (“Equity follows the law, but not slavishly nor at all times.”
(quoting Graf, 171 N.E. at 886) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
172
Land v. Esrig, 43 N.Y.S.2d 623, 626 (Sup. Ct. 1943).
173
Milbank Transcript, supra note 3, at 18; N.Y. C.P.L.R. 8004(b)
(McKinney 1981); see also Fourth Fed. Sav. Bank v. 32-22 Owners Corp.,
653 N.Y.S.2d 588, 590 (App. Div. 1997); Bankers Fed. Sav. Bank F.S.B. v.
Off W. Broadway Developers, 638 N.Y.S.2d 72 (App. Div. 1996).
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B. The Milbank Court’s Application of a Four-Factor
Equitable Test
The tenants urged the court to employ a four-factor
balancing test, drawn from several appellate and lower court
decisions, to examine (1) the degree of necessity of the
expenses; (2) whether there would be a benefit to the party that
requested a receiver be appointed; (3) whether the foreclosing
mortgage lender was aware that the building income would be
insufficient to pay the receiver’s expenses when it asked that one
be appointed; and (4) whether the funds would be judiciously
expended.174 That the properties were overleveraged and
“underwater” may also have contributed to the court’s
analysis.175 The tenants argued that, at some level, it was the
mortgage lender’s fault for having initially made an overly risky
loan.176 At oral argument, the court heard details on each factor
of the test. While the court’s reasoning and application are not
always laid bare in the transcript, the record contains enough
facts to support its conclusion, which the court memorialized in
a one-page short form order.177
1. Necessity of Expenses
First, the court had to determine that the money the tenants
asked the Comm trust to advance was actually needed. In
Milbank, the repairs were surely necessary. With more than
4,300 violations, 756 of them immediately hazardous “C”
violations (the most serious category established by the City
178
Department of Housing Preservation and Development), the
174

Milbank Transcript, supra note 3, at 10; see also Fourth Fed. Sav.
Bank, 653 N.Y.S.2d at 590; Litho Fund Equities, Inc. v. Alley Spring
Apartments Corp., 462 N.Y.S.2d 907, 909 (App. Div. 1983); First N.Y. Bank
for Bus. v. T155 E. 34 Realty Co., 601 N.Y.S.2d 990, 993 (Sup. Ct. 1993).
175
Reply Brief of Tenant-Defendants, supra note 168, at 1–4.
176
Id.
177
Milbank, No. 380454/09 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Bronx Cnty. Mar. 17, 2009)
(granting motion “for reasons stated on the record”); Milbank Transcript,
supra note 3, at 20.
178
HPD Online Glossary, supra note 163 (“The law establishes three
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ten buildings were literally falling apart.179 The roofs were
leaking, and mold was growing.180 Despite boiler repairs that the
plaintiff claimed were completed, the buildings had a history of
lacking heat even after repairs were supposedly done.181 The
court heard argument on September 29, just days before New
York City’s “heat season” typically begins on October 1.182
The Comm trust had already advanced more than $1 million to
the receiver, which the trust claimed was spent repairing or
replacing boilers and elevators and fixing gas leaks.183 But the
receiver stated that these funds were only enough to pay water and
fuel bills, along with the buildings’ insurance premiums and real
estate taxes.184 The Comm trust also argued that the court should
not interfere with the status quo because a sale was imminent, and
that the fact that the city agency charged with correcting serious
violations had decided to take no action suggested that the repairs
could await this sale.185 But the court was more convinced by the
fact that the case had already languished for eighteen months on the
court’s calendar.186 In rejecting plaintiff’s counsel’s suggestion that
classes of violations which are: ‘A’, non-hazardous; ‘B’, hazardous; or ‘C’,
immediately hazardous.”).
179
See Milbank Transcript, supra note 3, at 10–11.
180
Id. at 7 (“Mr. Levy [tenants’ counsel]: . . . something [on] the order
of five million dollars would make it possible for the receiver to repair the
roof so [that] when they go in and correct the mold in somebody’s bathroom
it doesn’t just leak the next time it rains and the mold reoccurs.”).
181
Reply Brief of Tenant-Defendants, supra note 168, at 7.
182
Heat and Hot Water, HPD, http://www.nyc.gov/html/hpd/html/
tenants/heat-and-hot-water.shtml (last visited Nov. 27, 2011) (describing legal
requirement for owners to provide heat to tenants).
183
Brief of Comm 2006-C8, supra note 166, at 2–3.
184
Amended Affidavit of Cicciu, supra note 8, at paras. 14–16.
185
Milbank Transcript, supra note 3, at 15 (“Mr. Tross [plaintiff’s
counsel]: . . . . If the properties are in such disrepair, and I’m not saying
they’re not, they are in disrepair, but if the City felt that something urgently
needed to be done they could take over these buildings and manage the
buildings themselves. They have not seen fit to do it and, quite frankly, the
reason for that is we’ve met with the City counsel, we’ve met with HPD.
They know exactly what we’re working on and they are confident that what
we’re working on is the correct solution here . . . .”).
186
Id. at 17 (“The Court: . . . . [Y]ou’re suggesting [that the sale i]s
going to happen within the week, but I heard that two weeks ago, that it was
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the repairs were not urgently needed, the court implicitly found
that they were necessary.
2. Benefit to the Mortgagee
The tenants also argued that the equities weighed in their
favor because improving the Milbank properties would actually
inure to the benefit of the plaintiff. They argued—and plaintiff
did not dispute—that in particular, improvements would arrest
the deterioration of the mortgagee’s security.187 Indeed, many of
the units in Milbank’s buildings were uninhabitable and
generated no income.188 Repairing the properties to a rentable
state would likely begin to show returns quite rapidly.189 In
addition to preserving the value of its collateral, the Comm trust
would also benefit from avoiding fines or penalties assessed
against the property for failure to correct violations.190 On the
other hand, making extensive repairs may have been out-of-sync
with Milbank’s investment strategy. Some of the units were firedamaged, and perhaps Milbank may have wanted to tear down
one of the buildings and rebuild instead of repairing the firedamaged units (in which case repairing those units would have
going to happen within two weeks, and before that I heard that again and
again and again.”).
187
Id. at 10; see also Idan Holding Corp. v. 244 Water Realty Corp.,
154 N.Y.S.2d 396, 397 (Sup. Ct. 1956) (“[T]he preservation of the property
inures to the benefit of the plaintiff whether he subsequently becomes the
purchaser at the foreclosure sale or whether he preserves it merely because
he may receive full value therefore when the sale is held.”).
188
Amended Affidavit of Cicciu, supra note 8, at para. 10 (“[T]he
vacancy rate, which was 10%, upon my initial appointment, is now
approaching 25%.”).
189
See Jemrock Realty Co. v. Krugman, 899 N.Y.S.2d 161, 163 (App.
Div. 2010), appeal dismissed, 936 N.E.2d 913 (finding owner had met
burden of showing it was entitled to a rent increase for a rent-regulated
apartment); see also supra note 84 (describing method for removing
apartments from rent regulation). While deregulating an apartment would
certainly help increase the building’s profitability, it is less likely to occur in
The Bronx than in Manhattan, and at bottom, any rent is better than no rent.
190
See Contempt and Penalties, N.Y.C. HOUS. COURT, http://nycourts.
gov/courts/nyc/housing/contempt.shtml (last visited Jan. 20, 2012).
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been a waste of time and money),191 but the Comm trust offered
no such rationale. In the end, the court was more “concerned
about the condition of the apartments where there are people
living” and did not inquire at length into whether the $2.5
million payment would benefit the Comm trust.192
3. Foreseeable Deficit
The court did, however, consider the fairness of imposing a
new cost on a mortgagee in a foreclosure action when it might
not have foreseen the new cost arising.193 The idea is to avoid
undue surprise by holding a party liable for hidden defects when
it has only a bare financial interest in the building.194 This part of
the test examines only what the plaintiff (even if it is not the
original lender) knew at the time it sought the receiver.195
Finally, it focuses on the receivership and considers the futility
of appointing a caretaker for a property who is unable to take
care of it.196 The conditions of the Milbank properties had been
so poor for so long that the plaintiff should have known that the
receivership would suffer a deficit if the receiver attempted to
comply with his statutory duties by bringing the buildings up to
code.197 Thus, the Milbank court did not find foreseeability much
of a hurdle in directing the payment.198
191

See Fact Sheet #11: Demolition, N.Y. STATE HOMES & CMTY.
RENEWAL, http://www.dhcr.state.ny.us/Rent/FactSheets/orafac11.htm (last
updated Nov. 30, 2008).
192
Milbank Transcript, supra note 3, at 12.
193
Id. at 12–13 (“The Court: Are you consenting to th[e tenants’]
application? Mr. Tross [plaintiff’s counsel]: No, your Honor. The Court:
Why not? You asked for the receiver. You knew the buildings weren’t in
great shape.”).
194
But see LEFCOE, supra note 158, at 107 (“Buyers of commercial
property take physical inspections seriously . . . [M]ost institutional lenders
. . . can look to professional ‘due diligence’ service providers.”).
195
See infra Part V.B.2.
196
See Herz et al., supra note 26, at 33–34.
197
Amended Affidavit of Cicciu, supra note 8, at para. 16 (“It is
abundantly clear to all that the Buildings[’] problems cannot be addressed via
the current rent roll.”).
198
Milbank Transcript, supra note 3, at 12–13, 18–19.
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4. Judicious Expense
Spending money to fulfill a duty under law, remediating
immediately hazardous conditions, repairing fire damage,
stopping cascading leaks, and supplying heat and hot water to
poor Bronx tenants are, this Note argues, the definition of
“judicious.”199 International law as well as many scholars and
advocates recognize decent, quality housing as a human right.200
In many ways, New York State and New York City law echo
this sentiment, such as by requiring receivers to prioritize
remediating violations of the Housing Maintenance Code.201
Not only should the money be spent on justifiable ends, but
the amount should also be reasonable with respect to the need.
The tenants estimated that this work would cost about $5
million.202 The plaintiff argued that the law did not require it to
pay anything.203 Splitting the difference, the Milbank court
directed the plaintiff to advance $2.5 million to the receiver,
leaving open the possibility of directing the plaintiff to advance
more funds later.204 In the end, $2.5 million will go a long way,
if not to correct all the serious, open violations, then at least to
199

See City of New York v. 629 Ltd. P’ship, 519 N.Y.S.2d 779, 782
(Sup. Ct. 1987).
200
Chester Hartman, The Case for a Right to Housing, in A RIGHT TO
HOUSING: FOUNDATION FOR A NEW SOCIAL AGENDA 177, 179, 187–88 n.8
(Rachel G. Bratt et al. eds., 2006) (citing various sources of international law
containing right-to-housing provisions).
201
N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 1325(3)(b) (McKinney 2009)
(“[P]riority shall be given to the correction of immediately hazardous and
hazardous violations of housing maintenance laws.”).
202
Milbank Transcript, supra note 3, at 7.
203
Id. at 13.
204
Id. at 20. The plaintiff obtained a stay from the Appellate Division,
but the stay was later vacated on the tenants’ motion. The parties have since
settled, and a new purchaser has agreed to make all the needed repairs. Email from Ian Davie, Staff Att’y, Legal Servs. N.Y.C.–Bronx, to author
(Sept. 6, 2011) (on file with author) (explaining that among the settlement
terms, the Comm trust agreed to “pay heat/hot water through the winter, fix
a crumbling retaining wall, fix an elevator . . . and perfect . . . [its] appeal
by a certain date,” while a deal was “hashed out . . . with the new
buyer/landlord . . . [giving the] tenants some protection.”).
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correct the most serious violations—or, as happened here, to
force a settlement.
V. FORECLOSURE COURTS SHOULD EXTEND EQUITABLE
REMEDIES FOR TENANTS
Milbank was correctly decided, and New York foreclosure
courts should apply its reasoning to hold foreclosing mortgagees
accountable for conditions that threaten tenants’ safety or wellbeing.205 In order to protect tenants of apartment buildings in
foreclosure, particularly those that are not owner-occupied,
courts should require the foreclosing mortgagee to bear the
unmet cost of needed repairs during the foreclosure action.
Precedent and equity provide a legal framework to support this
rule, and public policy concerns grounded in efficiency and
common-sense fairness undergird it.
A. Legal Framework for Holding a Foreclosing Mortgage
Lender Liable
Though somewhat novel, there is a sound legal basis to hold
the foreclosing mortgagee accountable under an equity rule,
especially where a receiver is appointed. A receiver in a
foreclosure action stands in the shoes of the owner, and has a
“legal duty to maintain the property in good repair and is liable for
damages for the failure to meet that duty.”206 Because the receiver
is a court-appointed officer, the court can order it to comply with
legal duties.207 State law provides for postjudgment recoupment
205

Tenant advocates are currently seeking to extend Milbank in order to
provide relief to tenants in foreclosed properties who, by no fault of their
own, suffer from a lack of repairs. See, e.g., Nat’l Bank of N.Y.C. v. 296
5th Ave. Grp., No. 29057/09 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Kings Cnty. Dec. 20, 2011)
(granting similar motion); N.Y. Cmty. Bank v. 1255 Longfellow LLC, No.
306660/10 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Bronx Cnty. Aug. 12, 2010) (filing with similar
motion pending).
206
Fourth Fed. Sav. Bank v. 32-22 Owners Corp., 653 N.Y.S.2d 588
(App. Div. 1997) (citing N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 9-101 (McKinney 2010));
see supra Part II.
207
In re Kane, 553 N.E.2d 1005, 1007 (N.Y. 1990).
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from the mortgagee for the receiver’s necessary expenditures, but
it is, by its terms, not an exclusive remedy.208 But imposing liability
on a foreclosing mortgagee who is not yet an owner is doctrinally
problematic.209 Because the warranty of habitability and other duties
apply only to an “owner,” the more difficult case is one in which
the mortgagee has not yet won a judgment in a foreclosure action,
and is, therefore, not the legal owner.210 However, laws requiring
postjudgment advances and permitting prejudgment advances from
mortgagee to receiver211 suggest that the state legislature did not
intend that receivers should bear maintenance costs alone.
Appointed receivers may have a legal duty to correct Housing
Maintenance Code violations, but there is no expectation that they
use their own personal funds to do so.212
Courts have begun to recognize that they can craft equitable
rules to bridge this problematic statutory gap. In Fourth Federal
Savings Bank v. 32-22 Owners Corp., the Appellate Division
reasoned (in dicta) that a court might order the mortgagee to
make an advance to the receiver when the order appointing the
receiver contemplated further expenses beyond the receiver’s
available funds, thus requiring court approval.213 Tracking the
language of the statute, there the appointing order also “required
the receiver to ‘make repairs necessary to the preservation of the
property’ and to give priority to ‘the correction of immediately
hazardous and hazardous violations of housing maintenance
laws.’”214 In light of this, the court could “order the person who
208

N.Y. C.P.L.R. 8004(b) (McKinney 1981).
Union Sav. Bank v. 285 Lafayette Assocs., supra note 15, at 21;
Dep’t of Hous. Pres. & Dev. v. Greenpoint Sav. Bank, 646 N.Y.S.2d 601,
605–06 (Civ. Ct. 1995) (holding bank liable for fines, pre-RPAPL section
1307, where bank already won a judgment but allowed twenty-nine months to
elapse between judgment and sale, during which time it failed to maintain the
premises or provide heat and hot water).
210
N.Y. MULT. DWELL. LAW § 4(44) (McKinney 2001) (defining
“owner”); Union Sav. Bank v. 285 Lafayette Assocs., supra note 15, at 21.
211
C.P.L.R. 8004(b) (postjudgment); MULT. DWELL. § 302-b(1)
(prejudgment).
212
Herz et al., supra note 26, at 38.
213
Fourth Fed. Sav. Bank v. 32-22 Owners Corp., 653 N.Y.S.2d 588,
589–90 (App. Div. 1997).
214
Id. at 589 (quoting the appointing order, tracking the language of
209
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applied for the receiver—in this case, plaintiff bank—to pay for
necessary expenditures in cases where the receiver lacks the
funds to do so.”215 The court reasoned that, “if such necessary
repairs were funded by rents paid by the tenants . . . [it] would
lead to the inequitable result of compelling tenants to advance
funds for housing which they are not receiving.”216 Breach of the
warranty of habitability, after all, is a defense to an eviction
proceeding for nonpayment of rent, and state law recognizes that
tenants need not pay (full) rent for apartments that are firedamaged, unheated, or lacking other essentials.217 Fourth Federal
merely recognizes that this principle ought not change in the
event the owner faces foreclosure. Therefore, courts should
require prejudgment advances where the circumstances call for
it, and where equity supports it.218
B. Weighing the Equities in Multiple Dwellings in
Foreclosure
Considering all the circumstances includes considering the
mortgagee’s position as well as that of innocent tenants. Keeping
the building in good repair is necessarily and obviously
incidental to the mortgagee’s purpose, and often benefits its
bottom-line.219 The rational profit-maximizing mortgagee must
wish to preserve the value of the mortgaged property—the
collateral for its loan—during the foreclosure action,220 because it
usually ends up selling the building to recoup unpaid amounts
due from the mortgagor.221 In the event of a sale, a building in
N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 1325(3)(b) (McKinney 2009)).
215
Fourth Fed. Sav. Bank, 653 N.Y.S.2d at 590 (citing C.P.L.R.
8004(b)).
216
Id.
217
See Jenkins v. Fieldbridge Assocs., LLC, 877 N.Y.S.2d 375, 376
(App. Div. 2009) (enforcing rent reduction order issued by state agency).
218
Fourth Fed. Sav. Bank, 653 N.Y.S.2d at 589–90; City Council
Amicus Brief, supra note 19, at 15 n.49.
219
See supra Part IV.B.2.
220
See Litho Fund Equities, Inc. v. Alley Spring Apartments Corp., 462
N.Y.S.2d 907, 908 (App. Div. 1983).
221
N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 1354 (McKinney 2009). Perhaps, if
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better condition commands a higher price.222 Likewise, a
mortgagee who retains the property would benefit from its better
condition by being able to command higher rents.223 Tenant
advocates have pointed out, and this Note also urges, that there
are other, less obvious equitable considerations to balance: the
circumstances surrounding the building’s financial condition
when the loan was originated, who the plaintiff is, the
availability of funds, and broader effects such as blight. Taken
together, it is often unfair to impose the cost of repairs during a
gap period (or the cost of suffering without repairs) on innocent
tenants rather than on foreclosing mortgagees.
1. Holding Reckless Lenders Accountable
As described above in Part III, predatory equity has wreaked
havoc on affordable housing and has worked to pull apart
diverse, urban neighborhoods by giving owners perverse
incentives to push out tenants paying below-market rents.
Although owners may face direct liability for harassing tenants,
there is also support for finding mortgagees liable at equity
when the lender’s participation in such a plan was reckless or
there is a settlement, the mortgagor retains the building for at least some
time, during which the mortgagee benefits from the mortgagor’s continued
payments on the mortgage note. AM. SECURITIZATION FORUM, STATEMENT
OF PRINCIPLES, RECOMMENDATIONS AND GUIDELINES FOR THE MODIFICATION
OF SECURITIZED SUBPRIME RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE LOANS 1 (2007), available
at http://www.americansecuritization.com/uploadedFiles/ASF%20Subprime%
20Loan%20Modification%20Principles_060107.pdf
(“The
modification
provisions that govern loans that are in default or reasonably foreseeable default
typically also require that the modifications be in the best interests of the
securityholders or not materially adverse to the interests of the
securityholders.”).
222
Idan Holding Corp. v. 244 Water Realty Corp., 154 N.Y.S.2d 396
(Sup. Ct. 1956) (“[T]he preservation of the property inures to the benefit of
the plaintiff whether he subsequently becomes the purchaser at the foreclosure
sale or whether he preserves it merely because he may receive full value
therefore when the sale is held.”); Robert M. Washburn, The Judicial and
Legislative Response to Price Inadequacy in Mortgage Foreclosure Sales, 53
S. CAL. L. REV. 843, 845 (1980).
223
See In re Lincoln Square Slum Clearance Project, 222 N.Y.S.2d 786,
797 (App. Div. 1961).
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negligent and injured tenants.224 In the run-up to the 2008 market
collapse, many banks turned a blind eye to the foreseeable harm
their actions posed to third parties.225 Although many individual
loan officers probably did not consider the effect that lax
underwriting and oversize loans would have on long-term
tenants of properties being purchased, large institutions should
have been aware of troubling trends.226 Their customers,
especially purchasers of distressed properties, generally view
remaining tenants as a costly nuisance.227 But prearranging tenant
harassment and coercion through unsustainable financing is
another story. Putting tenants’ feet to the fire by withholding
services or repairs is illegal.228 Investors who state their intent to

224

City Council Amicus Brief, supra note 19, at 15 (“[A] bank’s
decision to offer [a] disproportionately high level of funding—i.e.,
‘overleveraging’ the property—often contributes to the owner’s default, the
physical deterioration of the building and the receiver’s inability to fund
maintenance and repairs from the rent rolls.”). But see LEFCOE, supra note
158, at 193 (“[T]he concept of suitability has little current support in the case
law . . . . [L]enders do not even owe borrowers the duty of care to avoid
negligence in the lending process.”).
225
Michael Lewis, It’s the Economy, Dummkopf!, VANITY FAIR (Sept.
2011), http://www.vanityfair.com/business/features/2011/09/europe-201109
(“[T]raders may have sunk their firms by turning a blind eye to the risks in
the subprime-bond market, but they made a fortune . . . and have for the
most part never been called to account.”).
226
City Council Amicus Brief, supra note 19, at 15.
227
Bruce J. Bergman, So Your Client Wants to Buy at a Foreclosure
Sale: Pitfalls and Possibilities, N.Y. ST. B. J., Sept. 2003, at 43, 45 (“[I]n a
perfect world, the defaulting borrower, or his tenants, would quietly depart
the foreclosed premises after the foreclosure sale and before the closing.”).
228
N.Y.C. CHARTER & ADMIN. CODE ANN. §§ 27-2004(a)(48), 272005(d) (N.Y. Legal Publishing Corp. 1993 & Supp. 2011); N.Y. REAL
PROP. LAW § 235-d (McKinney 2006) (“[I]t shall be unlawful . . . for any
landlord . . . to engage in . . . interruption or discontinuance or willful
failure to restore services . . . if such conduct is intended to cause the tenant
. . . to vacate.”); see also N.Y. PENAL LAW § 241.05 (McKinney 2008)
(“An owner is guilty of harassment of a rent regulated tenant when with
intent to cause a rent regulated tenant to vacate a housing accommodation,
such owner . . . intent[ionally] . . . [or r]ecklessly causes physical injury to
such tenant or to a third person. Harassment of a rent regulated tenant is a
class E felony.”).
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“improve[ the] tenant base”229 of affordable housing by
aggressively pursuing turnover should have raised red flags to
lenders.230 There is also ample evidence that, aided by stubborn
residential segregation and redlining, the current foreclosure
crisis has disproportionately affected minority homeowners.231
Banks should also be held to account for the effects of similar
discrimination against renters in communities of color.
Legislatures have consistently adopted tenant-protectionist
views in response to the threat of predatory equity,232 and courts
should follow suit. Despite there being no clear statutory
authority, a court may use its equitable power to order the
lender to pay for repairs where the lender’s negligence or
recklessness in making a loan based on unrealistic expectations
of high turnover resulted in improper pressure on the mortgagor
to harass or coerce tenants into leaving by withholding repairs or
services.233 That many banks received credit on their Community
229

Milbank Tenants’ Memorandum of Law, supra note 2, at 1 (quoting
Portfolio, MILBANK, http://www.milbankre.com/portfolio.php (last visited
Feb. 20, 2012) (“Milbank identified [its Bronx] assets as having added value
for its investors and that revitalization would occur by infusing the capital
necessary to improve the condition of the buildings, as well as aggressively
pursuing the collection of past-due rents—allowing for an improved tenant
base.”)).
230
See ASS’N FOR NEIGHBORHOOD & HOUS. DEV., supra note 85, at 22–
25.
231
City Council Amicus Brief, supra note 19, at 4; Steil, supra note 80,
at 76–86; Dunn, supra note 80. But see EDWARD L. GLAESER & JACOB
VIGDOR, MANHATTAN INST. FOR POLICY RESEARCH, THE END OF THE
SEGREGATED CENTURY 3–7 (2012) (arguing that U.S. cities are today more
racially integrated than at any time since 1910). Plaintiffs have sued banks
such as Wells Fargo (the trustee in Milbank) for discriminatory lending
practices. Steil, supra note 80, at 85 n.73 (describing suit alleging bank
targeted African-Americans for subprime loans by classifying applicants by
race in the bank’s internal mortgage application software).
232
See, e.g., City Council Amicus Brief, supra note 19, at 10 (describing
rationale behind the Tenant Harassment Act, N.Y.C. CHARTER & ADMIN.
CODE ANN. §§ 27-2004(a)(48), 27-2005(d) (N.Y. Legal Publishing Corp.
1993)).
233
Katherine M. Lehe, Comment, Cracks in the Foundation of Federal
Law: Ameliorating the Ongoing Mortgage Foreclosure Crisis Through
Broader Predatory Lending Relief and Deterrence, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 2049,
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Reinvestment Act exams for making these oversized loans in
low- and moderate-income census tracts makes an accounting all
the more compelling.234 When a court has no other tool to
adequately address wrongful conduct, it may use its equitable
powers to reach a fair result.
2. When the Plaintiff Isn’t the Original Lender
The “reckless lender” argument is somewhat less persuasive
where the mortgage note has been bought and sold several
times, and the plaintiff in the foreclosure action did not originate
the loan.235 Indeed, the Uniform Commercial Code, which
governs the sale of promissory notes associated with mortgages,
insulates a “holder in due course” from preexisting property
claims, unless the purchaser had actual knowledge of the prior
claim.236 At first blush, the “holder in due course” doctrine
2069–84 (2010). The new federal Consumer Finance Protection Bureau also
has wide authority to regulate consumer mortgage lending, and could
presumably add protections against predatory equity, but it is not clear that it
will do so. See Kerri Panchuk, CFPB Outlines Mortgage Servicing
Regulation Strategy, HOUSINGWIRE (Oct. 13, 2011), http://www.housing
wire.com/2011/10/13/cfpb-outlines-mortgage-servicing-regulation-strategy;
see also David Reiss, Message in a Mortgage, 31 B.U. REV. BANKING &
FIN. L. (forthcoming 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2018940.
234
UNIV. NEIGHBORHOOD HOUS. PROGRAM, NEW YORK CITY’S
MULTIFAMILY HOUSING IN DISTRESS 29 (2011), available at http://www.unhp.
org/pdf/MultifamilyDistress.pdf.
235
Union Sav. Bank v. 285 Lafayette Assocs., supra note 15.
236
N.Y. U.C.C. LAW §§ 9-109(a)(3), 9-109 cmt. 7 (McKinney 2002)
(“The security interest in the promissory note is covered by this Article even
though the note is secured by a real-property mortgage.”). Article 9 “does
not determine the circumstances under which and the extent to which a
person who is obligated on a negotiable instrument is disabled from asserting
claims and defenses. Rather, Article 3 must be consulted. See, e.g., Sections
3-305, 3-306.” § 9-403 cmt. 2. New York’s U.C.C. Article 3, Section 3304(7) provides that “to constitute notice of a claim or defense, the purchaser
must have knowledge of the claim or defense or knowledge of such facts that
his action in taking an instrument amounts to bad faith.” N.Y. U.C.C. LAW
§ 3-304(7) (McKinney 2001). The subsequent purchaser of a mortgage note,
as a “holder in due course,” takes it free and clear of claims to the note,
unless it has actual notice of the claims. In re AppOnline.com, Inc., 285
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would seem to absolve many subsequent holders of mortgage
notes, including investment trusts holding mortgage-backed
securities, from preexisting claims relating to the mortgage, such
as claims that the loan originator engaged in predatory
lending.237 But neither Article 3, which contains the “holder in
due course” bar, nor Article 9, which governs the sale of
promissory notes, speaks to claims by third parties, unrelated to
ownership of the note, and arising after the interest in the
mortgage and note changes hands.238 Breaches of the warranty of
habitability and violations of the Housing Maintenance Code are
often continuous, ongoing breaches and violations.239 Thus, a
mortgagee’s “holder in due course” status should not bar this
kind of relief. Still, without something more, the equities may
not favor liability for a seemingly blameless successor
mortgagee before it obtains a judgment of foreclosure.240
B.R. 805, 819 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2002) (interpreting New York law), aff’d,
321 B.R. 614 (E.D.N.Y. 2003), aff’d, 128 F. App’x 171 (2d Cir. 2004).
Further, the purchaser’s rights are not “affected by constructive notice,
unless it clearly appear[s] that the inquiry suggested by the facts disclosed at
the time of the purchase would[,] if fairly pursued[,] result in the discovery
of the defect existing but hidden at the time.” Mfrs. & Traders Trust Co. v.
Sapowitch, 72 N.E.2d 166, 169 (N.Y. 1947) (quoting Birdsall v. Russell, 29
N.Y. 220, 250 (1864) (Wright, J.)) (internal quotation marks omitted). New
York is the only state that has not adopted the revised Article 3. PERMANENT
EDITORIAL BD. FOR THE UNIF. COMMERCIAL CODE, APPLICATION OF THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE TO SELECTED ISSUES RELATING TO MORTGAGE
NOTES 2 n.6 (2011), available at http://ali.org/00021333/PEB%20
Report%20-%20November%202011.pdf.
237
Lehe, supra note 233, at 2066 (“[M]any borrowers who seek to
challenge their mortgage loans as predatory find that the ‘holder in due
course’ doctrine bars suit against the assignee who currently holds the
mortgage note, and assignment of the mortgage precludes them from bringing
suit against the mortgage originator.”).
238
See U.C.C. §§ 3-304(7), 9-403; see also Kurt Eggert, Held Up in
Due Course: Predatory Lending, Securitization, and the Holder in Due
Course Doctrine, 35 CREIGHTON L. REV. 503, 607–35 (2002) (recommending
eliminating the holder in due course doctrine for all noncommercial loans).
239
Bartley v. Walentas, 434 N.Y.S.2d 379, 383 (App. Div. 1980).
240
Union Sav. Bank v. 285 Lafayette Assocs., supra note 15, at 21; cf.
N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 1307 (McKinney 2009) (imposing
postjudgment duty to maintain premises on foreclosing mortgagee).
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The Milbank decision sheds light on this thorny issue. The court,
relying on Fourth Federal, only considered whether the party who
sought the receiver was aware of the receiver’s likely deficit. It did
not ask whether the Comm trust knew about the buildings’ finances
when it acquired the mortgage note.241 Given this appellate authority,
a New York foreclosure court deciding a similar claim need not
quibble about the precise identity of the plaintiff.242 It might be more
difficult to impose liability on the trust as opposed to the original
lender, but this did not prevent the Milbank court from doing so.243
The trust became liable when it asked the foreclosure court to
appoint a receiver yet failed to investigate and disclose the
precarious financial situation the receiver would inherit.244 However,
the court is still likely to look for some other reason to support
finding the subsequent purchaser of a mortgage note liable for
damages that are several steps removed from its own actions.
In some ways, the plaintiff can nearly always be linked back
to the original lender. In Milbank, the plaintiff was not the
original lender—the original mortgage lender was Deutsche
Bank.245 Deutsche Bank repackaged the mortgage note into a
huge mortgage-backed securities trust, which it sold to
investors.246 While there was a lack of one-to-one identity, the
demand for mortgages to back such securities was a driving

241

Milbank Transcript, supra note 3, at 18.
See Fourth Fed. Sav. Bank v. 32-22 Owners Corp., 653 N.Y.S.2d
588, 590 (App. Div. 1997).
243
Milbank, No. 380454/09 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Bronx Cnty. Sept. 29, 2010)
(granting motion “for reasons stated on the record”); Milbank Transcript,
supra note 3, at 18–19. Although the plaintiff in Milbank argued it should not
be liable because it created a special-purpose L.L.C., which took title to the
mortgage note, the L.L.C. was a wholly owned subsidiary of the Comm
trust, a subterfuge the Milbank court easily saw past. Reply Brief of TenantDefendants, supra note 168, at 2. Even though the trust was owned by
investors who were not parties to the action, the trust itself was nevertheless
held liable. Id.
244
Reply Brief of Tenant-Defendants, supra note 168, at 2. But see
LEFCOE, supra note 158, at 178–79 (describing difficulty of due diligence for
mortgage-backed securities investors and tendency to freeload).
245
Milbank Tenants’ Memorandum of Law, supra note 2, at 1.
246
Id.
242
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force behind banks’ making loans with lax underwriting.247 In
this way, the beneficiaries of the Comm trust played a role in
causing the outsized loan to be made (though granted, someone
else may have bought the securities if they had not).248 In this
way, a link, however attenuated, can be drawn from the loan
originator to the plaintiff in the foreclosure action.
Aside from identity, this also raises questions of what duties
a mortgage investor (or trustee) owes to third parties when it
acquires or forecloses on a mortgage.249 The scope of inquiry
required at first seems potentially huge—the ten Bronx apartment
buildings in Milbank were only a small piece of a multibilliondollar investment vehicle.250 But a mortgage-backed securities
holder like the Comm trust need not scrutinize the books of
every single mortgagor it forecloses on for likely deficits from
spending money on repairs—most of its mortgages are likely for
single-family homes for which no receiver is likely to be
sought.251 If, however, the property is an occupied multiple
dwelling and the mortgagee seeks a receiver, courts have found
that equity calls for an inquiry.252 The basic premise—that
247

See Been et al., supra note 69, at 390 (“The ability of mortgage
originators to remove mortgages from their books through securitization may
have also weakened originators’ incentives to carefully screen potential loans
and borrowers, as they retained little exposure to the risk of the originated
loans.”); Demyanyk & Van Hemert, supra note 82, at 1872 (“[L]enders were
to some extent aware of high [loan-to-value] ratios being increasingly
associated with risky borrowers.”); Maddaloni & Peydró, supra note 82, at
2124.
248
But see Nelson D. Schwartz & Shaila Dewan, Political Push Moves a
Deal On Mortgages Inches Closer, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 24, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/24/business/a-deal-on-foreclosures-inchescloser.html (“Senator Sherrod Brown of Ohio said the settlement [between
lenders, federal officials, and state attorneys general] as reported—its details
were not fully known—was too small and would allow banks to pass on the
cost of the settlement to ‘middle-class Americans’ whose pension funds hold
soured mortgage securities.”).
249
See LEFCOE, supra note 158, at 178–79.
250
Milbank Tenants’ Memorandum of Law, supra note 2, at 1.
251
See infra Part V.C.2.
252
Land v. Esrig, 43 N.Y.S.2d 623, 626 (Sup. Ct. 1943) (“The plaintiff
may not be heard to object when called upon to meet an ordinary obligation
necessarily and obviously incidental to the relief which he himself sought,
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tenants should not have to pay for housing they do not receive—
is the same regardless of who holds the mortgage and note.253
While imposing costs on a mortgagee who did not make a
reckless loan is less than ideal, it would be inequitable to allow
innocent tenants to continue to suffer because of a mortgagor’s
failure, and a receiver’s inability, to comply with the Housing
Maintenance Code and warranty of habitability.254
3. Other Equitable Concerns
Costs to the parties to the foreclosure action should not be
the court’s only concern. Blight has worsened during the
subprime-lending crisis,255 and the Milbank rule helps prevent
neglected buildings from depressing neighboring property
values.256 Abandoned properties also pose risks to neighbors,
since they are magnets for squatters, fires, and crime.257
Requiring the foreclosure plaintiff to pay for upkeep during the
proceeding is a perfect complement to state laws that aim to
fight blight by requiring foreclosing lenders to maintain

obtained and from which he reaped benefits.”). A duty of inquiry might also
be considered a quid pro quo for the limited liability a mortgagee enjoys with
a receiver in place. See supra text accompanying notes 49–52.
253
See Fourth Fed. Sav. Bank v. 32-22 Owners Corp., 653 N.Y.S.2d
588, 590 (App. Div. 1997).
254
City Council Amicus Brief, supra note 19, at 14–17; see Part V.D
infra (discussing implications).
255
See Meribah Knight & Bridget O’Shea, Foreclosures Leave Pockets of
Neglect and Decay, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 28, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/
2011/10/28/us/foreclosures-lead-to-crime-and-decay-in-abandoned-buildings.
html.
256
See, e.g., City Council Amicus Brief, supra note 19, at 5–6; Creola
Johnson, Fight Blight: Cities Sue to Hold Lenders Responsible for the Rise in
Foreclosures and Abandoned Properties, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 1169; Charles
Towe & Chad Lawley, The Contagion Effect of Neighboring Foreclosures 1
(May 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
1834805.
257
William Harless, In Richmond, Foreclosed Homes Breed a New Kind
of Problem, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 13, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/
2011/11/13/us/in-richmond-foreclosed-homes-breed-a-new-kind-of-problem.
html.
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properties after obtaining a judgment,258 and is even more
effective at nipping the problem in the bud.
Not only does this rule allow the lender to prevent the value
of its collateral from further deteriorating and creating blight,
but it also places the cost of upkeep on the party best able to
bear it.259 Anticipating these costs, lenders can spread them
among mortgagors by setting slightly higher interest rates on
mortgage loans or charging small fees,260 which efficiently places
the cost where it should be—on mortgagors, as a kind of
insurance.261 While lenders may no doubt pass added costs on to
mortgage consumers—and owners, in turn, to renters—the
overall effect will be negligible.262
Finally, applying the Milbank equitable rule avoids relying
on undesirable, resource-intensive, and often-unavailable
258

See, e.g., N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 1307 (McKinney 2009).
Most large U.S. mortgage lenders have benefited marvelously from
federal bailout funds, yet they have largely refused to reduce principal
balances for underwater borrowers. Neil M. Barofsky, Where the Bank
Bailout Went Wrong, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 29, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/
2011/03/30/opinion/30barofsky.html; see also Gretchen Morgenson, The
Deal Is Done, but Hold the Applause, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 11, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/12/business/mortgage-settlement-leavesmuch-to-be-desired-fair-game.html.
260
See, e.g., Elizabeth Williamson & Greg Hitt, Mortgage ‘Cramdown’
Plan Hits Turbulence in Senate, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 14, 2009), http://online.
wsj.com/article/SB123698730201425761.html (describing banking industry’s
effort to derail plan for homeowners’ mortgage write-downs, saying it
“would add risk to lenders, raise mortgage rates and clog courts”); cf. Bank
of America plans $5 debit card fee, CBS NEWS (Sept. 30, 2011),
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2011/09/29/business/main20113708.shtml
(describing banks’ response to federal regulation imposing additional pertransaction costs for debit card use); Eric Dash, Banks Quietly Ramp Up
Costs To Consumers, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 14, 2011), http://www.nytimes.
com/2011/11/14/business/banks-quietly-ramp-up-consumer-fees.html
(describing more subtle ways banks are responding to the same situation,
after Bank of America backed down from its $5 debit card fee).
261
Michael H. Schill, An Economic Analysis of Mortgagor Protection
Laws, 77 VA. L. REV. 489, 491 (1991) (“[T]he relatively modest costs
associated with state mortgagor protection laws do suggest that mortgagor
protections may indeed promote economic efficiency.”).
262
See infra Part V.D (discussing implications).
259
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government intervention to make costly emergency repairs—at
the expense of taxpayers—in exchange for a tax lien on the
property.263 Intervention, while sometimes available where an
owner has abandoned the property, is even less desirable where
a receiver controls the premises. This is because the lender
requested the receiver in order to protect its security and is
concerned about the condition of the building (if only for its
resale value), and because the lender must pay the receiver’s
expenses upon judgment and usually has the assets to do so.264
4. Which Repairs Should Be Covered by the Rule?
If the foreclosure court orders the mortgagee to pay for
repairs, it is an open question how serious a code violation must
be to trigger the lender’s contribution. Broken locks threaten the
safety of the tenants,265 and cascading water leaks have long been
considered by New York City agencies to be a serious condition
meriting intervention,266 but it is less clear that a leaky radiator
pipe in only one apartment should deserve the same attention.
Painted-over peepholes are also a threat to tenants’ security, but
not clearly as serious as a broken front door lock. Courts must
decide whether a duty to abate an infestation of rats or mice also
extends to roaches and bedbugs. The N.Y.C. Department of
Housing Preservation and Development (HPD) uses a letter
grading system that, while flawed, offers a handy proxy for
which items should be the lender’s financial responsibility and
which should await a new owner.267
263

See supra Part III.C.
See supra Part II.
265
Chris Opfer, Foreclosures Leave Apartment Buildings in Need of
Repair, GOTHAM GAZETTE (Sept. 2011), http://www.gothamgazette.com/
article/housing/20110915/10/3603.
266
Press Release, Dep’t of Hous. Pres. & Dev., HPD Commissioner
Cestero and Speaker Quinn Release Findings on First Round of Extensive
Inspections at Milbank Buildings (Nov. 18, 2010), available at
http://www.nyc.gov/html/hpd/html/pr2010/pr-10-19-10.shtml.
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Indeed, the definitions of B and C violations track the language of the
state statute requiring receivers to prioritize correction of dangerous
violations, reflecting a judgment of the legislature that some repairs are more
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The letter grading system uses grades of A, B, or C, with C
violations being the most serious.268 State law provides that the
receiver shall give priority to the correction of “immediately
hazardous and hazardous violations” of the code, which
correspond to class “B” and “C” violations.269 Not all violations
(especially “A” violations) constitute a breach of the warranty of
habitability.270 Funds spent to correct “B” and “C” violations are
therefore most likely to be judicious expenditures, and this
should be a reliable cutoff for receivers and lenders when
measuring compliance with their legal duties.
C. Applications of the Milbank Rule
While HPD’s violations definitions provide a bright-line rule,
the Milbank rule itself does not, and the rule’s applications are
not always so clear-cut. The trial court in Milbank extended an
equity rule contemplated by the appellate court in Fourth
Federal, without any certain appellate authority.271 At least one
other trial court, in National Bank v. 5th Avenue Group, has
followed suit.272 In late 2009, the owner of a small apartment
urgent than others. N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 1325(3)(b) (McKinney
2009).
268
HPD Online Glossary, supra note 163 (“The law establishes three
classes of violations which are: ‘A’, non-hazardous; ‘B’, hazardous; or ‘C’,
immediately hazardous.”).
269
Id.
270
Park W. Mgmt. Corp. v. Mitchell, 391 N.E.2d 1288, 1294 (N.Y.
1979) (“Housing codes do not provide a complete delineation of the
landlord’s obligation, but rather serve as a starting point in that determination
by establishing minimal standards that all housing must meet.” (citing Boston
Hous. Auth. v. Hemingway, 293 N.E.2d 831, 844 n.16 (Mass. 1973))). New
York also requires HPD to promulgate a list of which violations are “rentimpairing,” or serve as the basis for rent abatement or a defense to a suit for
the nonpayment of rent. N.Y. MULT. DWELL. LAW § 302-a (McKinney
2001).
271
Milbank Transcript, supra note 3, at 18–19 (“[E]ven though there’s
no authority before and it’s not been done before perhaps except in that one
case you cite . . . .”).
272
Nat’l Bank of N.Y.C. v. 296 5th Ave. Grp., No. 29057/09 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. Kings Cnty. Dec. 20, 2011).
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building in Brooklyn stopped paying its mortgage, and the bank
began to foreclose on the building.273 Intermittent heat and hot
water, roof leaks, and an unsecured front door plagued the six
tenants, many of whom were elderly or disabled.274 One year
later, the court appointed a receiver to collect rents and maintain
the property, but the receiver could not spend more than $2,000
at a time without the bank’s consent.275 The receiver hired
workers to fix the roof, but the leaks continued.276 In May 2011,
the tenants asked the foreclosure court for relief.277 By
September, their motion still pending, the building’s front door
remained unsecured, its locks broken.278 Worse, the property
seemed doomed from the start: its income was not nearly
enough to service the $1.85 million mortgage.279 In December
2011, the court granted the tenants’ motion in full, directing the
plaintiff mortgagee to advance funds to the receiver to cover the
cost of emergency repairs, reasoning that, “it would be equitable
for plaintiff to be required to advance funds to the Receiver
where rental income is insufficient for the Receiver to fulfill his

273

Opfer, supra note 265.
Id.
275
Id.
276
Id.
277
Id.
278
Id. (“‘That’s always been a problem. They fix it and then all of a
sudden it’s damaged again,’ said Raymond Jimenez, a retired butcher who
has lived in his fourth floor apartment for 48 years.”).
279
For example, a thirty-year fixed-rate mortgage at 5.5% interest, (a
conservative estimate), would have required monthly rental income of
$30,500 to sustain the mortgage payments. Affidavit of Heather Gershen at
paras. 8–9, Nat’l Bank of N.Y.C. v. 296 5th Ave. Grp., No. 29057/09
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Kings Cnty. Nov. 16, 2009). The six rent-regulated tenants
paid a combined $1,577 per month. Brief of Tenant-Defendants at paras. 3–
4, Nat’l Bank of N.Y.C. v. 296 5th Ave. Grp., No. 29057/09 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. Kings Cnty. Nov. 16, 2009). The building contains one other residential
unit and two commercial units that pay market rents, with a maximum total
rent roll of $8,463 per month, nowhere close to thirty thousand dollars. Id. at
para. 5. In order to get the loan, the owner cross-collateralized its interest in
the neighboring building, which itself had a $1.95 million mortgage. Reply
Affirmation at para. 3, Nat’l Bank of N.Y.C. v. 296 5th Ave. Grp., No.
29057/09 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Kings Cnty. Nov. 16, 2009).
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duty to repair and maintain the premises.”280 Nor, as the court
explained, was this designed to be a windfall to the tenants or
the receiver: “assuming the building is not ‘overleveraged,’ . . .
plaintiff will be made whole upon the sale of the property.”281
While trial courts seem to be receptive to extending the Milbank
rule, the following examples demonstrate that, in some
situations, application of the rule is not so straightforward.
1. Bedbugs
Whether the lender should pay for extermination of an
apartment building with six units where the tenants complain of
a building-wide bedbug282 infestation will depend on the degree
of the necessity of the expenditures. Bedbugs are currently
classified as a “B” violation of the Housing Maintenance
Code;283 therefore, the lender could be found responsible for
paying for the extermination, since it is the receiver’s duty to
correct “hazardous” conditions.284 But there could also be a
hidden causal factor if one of the tenants brought the bedbugs
in, in which case it is less clear that the mortgagee should be
responsible. Although exterminating bedbugs might have little
impact on the building’s long-term value, an infestation impacts
the habitability of the units for the current tenants and affects the
building’s current income if units cannot be rented. Provided the
“judicious expense” prong of the Milbank test is met, an
equitable remedy seems appropriate.
2. Single-Family Rental Homes
Unlike in a multiple dwelling, a tenant of a one-family home
in foreclosure faces an uphill battle to benefit from Milbank,
280

Nat’l Bank of N.Y.C. v. 296 5th Ave. Grp., No. 29057/09 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. Kings Cnty. Dec. 20, 2011).
281
Id.
282
See Bed Bugs, HPD, http://www.nyc.gov/html/hpd/html/tenants/BedBugs.shtml (last visited Dec. 1, 2011).
283
See Sample Notice of Violation, HPD, http://www.nyc.gov/html/hpd/
downloads/pdf/bed-bugs-sample1.pdf (last visited Feb. 20, 2012).
284
N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 1325 (McKinney 2009).
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because it would require extending the law with no clear
precedent (since the case law discussed so far deals only with
multiple dwellings).285 Tenants of single-family homes are
protected by the warranty of habitability,286 a foreclosing
mortgagee must maintain the premises after judgment,287 and
there is still a gap period between default and judgment. But the
principal problem is that receivers are rarely sought for singlefamily homes, and thus there is no statutory support (RPAPL
section 1325) for an equitable determination.288 The mortgagee
does risk becoming directly liable as a “mortgagee in
possession” if it takes steps to repair the property or collect rent
without a receiver in place, but mortgagees understandably steer
clear of these liabilities.289 While the tenant might not be able to
obtain immediate relief against the bankrupt owner in a separate
action, that avenue is available.290 In the end, the amounts
involved are likely smaller than in a multiple dwelling, making
self-help more feasible.291 The tenant can then sue the owner and
wait in line along with the owner’s other creditors,292 or attempt
to further extend the Milbank rule.
3. Where No Receiver Is Appointed
In buildings with fewer than six units, the mortgagee
plaintiff often forgoes seeking a receiver.293 Arguably, the Fourth
285

But see Lirosi v. Elkins, 453 N.Y.S.2d 718, 723 (App. Div. 1982)
(“[A] court of equity is not precluded from fashioning a suitable remedy,
although precedent is wanting.”).
286
REAL PROP. ACTS. § 235-b; Birch v. Ryan, 721 N.Y.S.2d 711, 711–
12 (App. Div. 2001).
287
REAL PROP. ACTS. § 1307.
288
See Rasmussen, supra note 16.
289
Mortimer v. E. Side Sav. Bank, 295 N.Y.S. 695, 698 (App. Div.
1937); Rasmussen, supra note 16.
290
See supra Part III.D.
291
See supra Part III.D.
292
See supra Part III.D.
293
Rasmussen, supra note 16 (“Receivers . . . are not usually appointed
to care for the small buildings that are the subject of the vast majority of
foreclosure actions now.”).
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Federal equitable inquiry is irrelevant in a case where there is
no receiver, the mortgagor is still in possession, or where the
mortgagee comes into possession. While legislatures increasingly
pass laws to protect tenants at foreclosure, at the same time
there is a desire to avoid fees and costs to small owners who
actually live in their buildings.294 Moreover, the tenants of a
small building may find it less likely for a live-in owner to skip
town (or skimp on repairs) and easier to compel the owner to
make repairs in an HP action.295
4. Affordable Loans and Not-for-Profit Lenders
While Milbank held a mortgagee accountable for a loan that
should possibly never have been made, its application to a
lender who made an affordable loan or to a not-for-profit lender
is more problematic because no “predatory equity” angle is
present and the lender likely has fewer assets at its disposal.
Milbank’s four-part equitable test does not necessarily speak to
this one way or the other. The court’s analysis focused on
whether the foreclosing mortgage lender had been aware that the
building’s income would be insufficient to pay the receiver’s
expenses when it asked that the court appoint a receiver.296
Application of the test would still result in a mortgagee’s
responsibility to pay for repairs, even though it made an
affordable loan, if the receiver’s anticipated expenses were more
than the anticipated income when the plaintiff sought to have a
receiver appointed.297 Nonprofits may have less capital to finance
interim upkeep, but they would still be liable for postjudgment
298
upkeep under the statute, which does not exempt them.
294

Hearings, supra note 1, at 164–65 (testimony of Elizabeth M. Lynch,
MFY Legal Servs.); E-mail from Brad Lander, N.Y.C. Councilmember, to
author (Nov. 13, 2011, 8:51 AM EST) (on file with author).
295
In an HP action, the tenant sues the owner and the Department of
Housing Preservation and Development seeking repairs to correct outstanding
violations. See supra Part III.D.
296
Fourth Fed. Sav. Bank v. 32-22 Owners Corp., 653 N.Y.S.2d 588,
590 (App. Div. 1997).
297
Id.
298
See N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 1307 (McKinney 2009).
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Alternatively, if the law were to require the lender to post a
compliance bond, it may not bear such a heavy financial
burden.299 In sum, despite its difficult application, the Milbank
rule is workable and malleable enough to make it a viable option
for tenants who have difficulty seeking repairs from owners in
foreclosure.
D. Implications of Extending Milbank
There are a few problematic implications of extending the
Milbank rule, such as increased costs to borrowers, disincentives
for foreclosure plaintiffs to seek receivers, and the propriety of
extending a liability rule in response to a crisis, since conditions
that currently justify reform may no longer exist in the future.
Taken together, however, the positive outcomes that would
result from wider application of the Milbank rule significantly
outweigh these consequences.
Banks may assert that the rule will decrease mortgage
lending, or make it more costly to lend to people at the
margins.300 But Milbank was an exceptional case in that most
buildings in foreclosure will not require millions of dollars in
additional funds to correct hazardous conditions.301 Banks have
shown that they can survive new regulatory requirements that
have significantly hurt their bottom line. For example, the cost
of compliance with new interchange fees for debit card
purchases will run into the billions, yet banks are finding smallbore ways of recouping these losses.302 In the context of
mortgage lending, where fees are already substantial and rising,
the net effect on consumers of a small market-wide increase due
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See infra Part VI.
See, e.g., Williamson & Hitt, supra note 260.
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See Nat’l Bank of N.Y.C. v. 296 5th Ave. Grp., No. 29057/09 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. Kings Cnty. Dec. 20, 2011) (ordering plaintiff to advance funds to
receiver for repairs estimated to cost $65,150); City Council Amicus Brief,
supra note 19, at 7 (“In fiscal year 2011, HPD budgeted over $29 million for
emergency repairs [citywide].”).
302
See Bank of America plans $5 debit card fee, supra note 260; Dash,
supra note 260.
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to the Milbank rule is probably minimal.303 From a public policy
perspective, spreading the cost of remediating poor housing
conditions across all mortgage borrowers is desirable because it
more effectively and more efficiently minimizes the risk of harm
to more people.304 In addition, slightly increasing the costs of
borrowing may deliver better incentives to consumers deciding
whether to rent or buy.305 Federal housing policy has placed too
strong an emphasis on homeownership, and many people who
were able to qualify for loans in 2006 would have been better
off renting instead.306 At bottom, however, extending Milbank
will probably increase costs to borrowers, but not by any
appreciable amount.307 It is also possible that extension of the
303

See Amy Hoak, Beware: Mortgage Fees Are Rising, WALL ST. J.
(Feb. 26, 2012), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203918304
577239470865575682.html.
304
See Schill, supra note 261, at 491; cf. Gretchen Morgenson, Hazard
Insurance with Its Own Perils, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 22, 2012),
http://www.nytimes. com/2012/01/22/business/hazard-insurance-with-its-ownperils-fair-game.html (“[Instead of forced-place insurance, a] more consumerfriendly way to deal with insurance lapses would be for [mortgage] servicers to
advance money to the borrower’s existing [insurance] carrier to keep the policy
current. Then, the servicer could bill the borrower for the coverage.”).
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See Kevin Quealy & Archie Tse, Is It Better to Buy or Rent?, N.Y.
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(last visited Mar. 12, 2012) (featuring an interactive tool weighing relative
costs of renting versus buying).
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See generally Arlo Chase, Rethinking the Homeownership Society:
Rental Stability Alternative, 18 J.L. & POL’Y 61 (2010) (arguing for a policy
shift away from homeownership and toward protecting renters through a
modified rent-regulation scheme); see also EDWARD L. GLAESER, TRIUMPH
CITY
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(2011)
(“The
home
interest
mortgage
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THE
deduction . . . encourages Americans to leverage themselves to the hilt to bet
on housing . . . . Subsidizing home ownership actually pushes up housing
prices by encouraging people to spend more.”); CHARLES R. MORRIS, THE
TRILLION DOLLAR MELTDOWN 69 (2008) (coining the term “NINJA loan,”
which stands for No Income, No Job or Assets, meaning loans made without
requiring proof of those typical signs of creditworthiness).
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See Gilberto Fuentes, What Causes Mortgage Borrowing Costs to
GATE,
http://homeguides.sfgate.com/causes-mortgageIncrease?,
SF
borrowing-costs-increase-8921.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2012) (identifying
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rule may increase rents for tenants; but, again, the overall effect
is probably negligible.308
Aside from mere cost, the plaintiff in Milbank argued that
extending liability to it would mean that foreclosure plaintiffs
would no longer be willing to seek receivers.309 But mortgagees
will still desire to have the limitation on liability that comes with
the appointment of a receiver, which is unavailable to them as
mortgagees-in-possession.310 Because of the favorable limitations
on liability, applying Milbank more broadly is unlikely to affect
the decision whether or not to seek the appointment of a
receiver.311 Mortgagees will still need to protect their security
from deterioration in order to recoup as much as possible from
the foreclosure sale. If the building needs repair, this is
practically impossible to accomplish without either having a
receiver or becoming a mortgagee-in-possession.312 Diverting a
building’s rental income from the owner and investing it back
into the building also makes sound business sense because it
maximizes the value of the loan’s collateral.313 This suggests that
mortgagees would still seek receivers just as often.
308

See Paula Beck, Fighting Section 8 Discrimination: The Fair Housing
Act’s New Frontier, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 155, 180 (1996)
(explaining how landlords might react to an influx of subsidized tenants by
spreading the cost across their subsidized and unsubsidized holdings). Costs
of financing are only one component of what the N.Y.C. Rent Guidelines
Board considers when deciding on a schedule of increases for rent-stabilized
apartments. Process by Which the Rent Guidelines Board Determines the
Guidelines, N.Y.C. RENT GUIDELINES BD., http://www.housingnyc.com/
html/guidelines/guidelines.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2012) (“These include:
the economic condition of the residential real estate industry in N.Y.C.
including such factors as the prevailing and projected (i) real estate taxes and
sewer and water rates, (ii) gross operating maintenance costs (including
insurance rates, governmental fees, cost of fuel and labor costs), (iii) costs
and availability of financing (including effective rates of interest), [and] (iv)
over-all supply of housing accommodations and over-all vacancy rates.”).
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Even if mortgagees are able to bear or distribute the
additional costs, and still seek receivers, extending a rule of law
during a financial crisis raises concerns about the rule’s
applicability after the crisis. Although the current situation
seems unprecedented,314 dangers to tenants at foreclosure are a
cyclical, recurring problem.315 The warranty of habitability and
housing code also do not typically change from boom to bust—
the duty that foreclosing lenders owe to tenants should remain
constant as well. Those tenants who pay rent are innocent
victims of a foreclosure, crisis or not.316
In sum, New York317 courts should extend Milbank to apply
more broadly where the receivership suffers a foreseeable
deficit, the expenses are necessary and judicious, and there will
be some benefit to the mortgagee. In addition, some courts may
insist on some level of culpability by the current mortgagee if it
is not the original lender. Extension of the rule will help protect
innocent renters who, by no fault of their own, suffer adverse
consequences from their landlords’ defaults.
VI. STATUTORY REMEDIES FOR TENANTS IN FORECLOSURE
ACTIONS SHOULD ALSO BE EXPANDED
Extending the Milbank rule is a vital part of a robust judicial
response to the foreclosure crisis, but legislatures also have a
role to play. Because the options available to tenants in such
situations (including the equitable remedy in Milbank) are few,
narrow, and uncertain, state legislatures should adopt laws
314

See supra Part III.
Rasmussen, supra note 22.
316
See Been & Glashausser, supra note 17, at 3.
317
In other states, tenant advocates and foreclosure courts should
consider whether equitable relief is available where the equitable factors from
Milbank are present. If, for instance, a Massachusetts building in foreclosure
is afflicted with a substantial Sanitary Code violation, under what
circumstances may the tenant compel the out-of-possession mortgagee to pay
for repairs before a judgment is entered? See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch.
111, § 127A (2002); Berman & Sons, Inc. v. Jefferson, 396 N.E.2d 981,
982–84 (Mass. 1979). After all, the tenant is entitled to stay absent good
cause for eviction. See supra Part III. This entitlement would serve little
purpose if the tenant were constructively evicted.
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formalizing a duty on the part of foreclosing mortgagees to
maintain the premises during the foreclosure action. This would,
importantly, close any loophole a lender might exploit by
declining to seek the appointment of a receiver it would
otherwise seek,318 or by starting the foreclosure action through a
mortgage servicer who is not technically the mortgagee.319
Codifying a legal duty would make it straightforward for tenants
to seek needed repairs in an action against the mortgagee,320 and
it would allow courts to skip the messy and searching inquiry
into whether the lender knew the receiver’s income would be
inadequate.321 Tenants caught in gap situations would be able to
seek relief without extensive motion practice.322 Ideally, a legal
duty on the books would be prophylactic and simply cause
foreclosing mortgagees to begin to fund necessary repairs as
soon as a receiver is appointed.323 But realistically, reform at the
state level may be far off.
In addition to the duty requirement, state legislatures should
create compliance-bond-posting requirements for mortgagees
who seek to foreclose on multiple dwellings. Such laws would
require the mortgagee to post a bond to cover anticipated costs
associated with compliance with the applicable housing code and
warranty of habitability at the start of the foreclosure action.324
318

Brief of Comm 2006-C8, supra note 166, at 7.
Hearings, supra note 1, at 164–65 (testimony of Elizabeth M. Lynch,
MFY Legal Servs.). If the mortgage servicer is not an assignee, the
mortgagee may also be a necessary party to the foreclosure action. See J.V.
Dempsey, Mortgagee or Lienholder as a Proper or Necessary Party to Suit in
Respect of Contract for Sale of Mortgaged Property, 164 A.L.R. 1044
(2011).
320
For example, the statute might authorize New York City tenants to
bring an HP action against the lender in Housing Court. See supra Part III.D.
321
See supra Part IV.B.3. A legal duty enacted at the state level would
obviate the need for Milbank’s four-factor equitable test in order to compel a
prejudgment advance from the mortgagee to the receiver.
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Cf. supra Part III.D (describing the non-availability of relief in
Housing Court against a receiver in particular and against the owner in
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Importantly, this would lessen the burden on mortgagees,
especially smaller ones, and help stabilize costs.
There are currently two proposals before the New York City
Council to enact local laws further strengthening protections for
tenants at foreclosure.325 Intro 0494-2011 would require mortgagees
who seek foreclosure to secure and maintain a compliance bond,
which would be used to cover the cost of compliance with the
Housing Maintenance Code.326 Intro 0500-2011 would establish a
duty requiring a foreclosing mortgagee to maintain the property
during the pendency of the foreclosure action.327 Yet unresolved is
whether any city law affecting foreclosures or nationally chartered
banks will, as the bill opponents claim, be preempted by state or
federal law.328 Both bills have been laid over in committee after a
hearing,329 and one of the bills’ sponsors reports that the committee
is working to address the preemption issues and to add a carve-out
for smaller, owner-occupied multiple dwellings.330
available at http://legistar.council.nyc.gov/ViewReport.ashx?M=R&N=Text
&GID=61&ID=876270&GUID=9F704201-DB6B-469D-B3F4-6201F52041
A1&Title=Legislation+Text (proposing to amend N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE tit.
27, ch. 2 by adding § 27-2109.1).
325
The City Council passed Intro 501-2011 into law on February 16,
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ViewReport.ashx?M=R&N=Text&GID=61&ID=1079568&GUID=0487EF
DD-CBF5-4F0E-B66E-4E6A9DFD2A47&Title=Legislation+Text (amending
the N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 27 by adding § 27-2109.1). While a
notification requirement is a great start, it does not directly address the plight
of tenants facing poor housing conditions, especially if one considers that
HPD may already know about most problem buildings because of the number
of tenant complaints and violations.
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Even if the mayor signs these measures into law, worrisome
concerns remain about state- or federal-law preemption of a
local law affecting the foreclosure process or regulating
nationally chartered banks.331 Passing new tenant protections at
the state level would alleviate any concern about state-law
preemption.332 Likewise, passing bank regulation at the federal
level could mollify any concern about federal-law preemption.333
But these are much more daunting challenges than attempts to
pass local legislation.334 Even though it is unlikely to pass at the
state or federal level, advocates should continue to push for
positive reform, since current statutory schemes are inadequate
to protect tenants,335 and an equitable remedy against a lender
will only aid those who can show that the mortgagee was aware
of a likely deficit when it asked for the receiver.336 A statutory
solution would contribute greatly to protecting tenants.
VII. CONCLUSION
Extending Milbank will help protect tenants of multiple
dwellings during the gap period between a mortgagor’s initial
default and a final judgment awarding possession to the
165 (testimony of Elizabeth M. Lynch) (“In our experience, homeowners
. . . in one- to four-family houses, rarely abandon their houses. They usually
maintain the property and try to work with the bank to get a modification.”).
331
Stoffer v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety of Huntington, 907 N.Y.S.2d 38, 45
(App. Div. 2010) (“Where the Legislature has not expressly forbidden local
governments from superseding state law, a local government may
nevertheless be prohibited from enacting superseding legislation, pursuant to
the doctrine of preemption, where the State has evidenced an intent to occupy
the field.”); see also Cuomo, 129 S. Ct. at 2721; Hearings, supra note 1, at
85 (testimony of Michael P. Smith).
332
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333
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334
Michael Powell & Nicholas Confessore, Dysfunction Displaces Work
in Distracted Albany, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 6, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/
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agree that today is Thursday.” (quoting Daniel J. O’Donnell, Assemblyman,
N.Y.C.) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
335
See supra Part III.
336
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mortgagee, especially in the increasingly common scenario when
the owner “walks away.” By providing a source of funding for
necessary repairs, the four-factor equitable test helps reinforce
existing eviction-protection measures for tenants and serves as a
backstop against constructive eviction, blight, and the loss of
affordable housing through predatory equity. Finally, though
proponents face several challenges, codifying a duty or a
compliance-bond requirement will also go a long way toward
realizing Milbank’s potential to solve this persistent problem.337
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